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Symbolic Politics for Disempowered Communities:
State Environmental Justice Policies
Tonya Lewis* & Jessica Owley **
I. INTRODUCTION
When Samara Swanston was growing up in the Corona and East
Elmhurst neighborhoods of Queens, New York, she played in vacant
lots and small wetlands containing turtles, frogs, salamanders, and
tent caterpillar nests in the trees. Decades later, the vacant lots that
once served as playgrounds for jovial children had come to serve as
local dumps for companies illegally disposing metal parts and batter-
ies. Pollution had turned the air toxic. Her husband began to experi-
ence increased asthma attacks. His doctor told him to move out of
New York City. He later died of an asthma attack en route to the
hospital. A second relative died at the age of 21 of an asthma attack in
her Bronx apartment on an "ozone alert" day.'
Swanston told her story before a 1991 public hearing committee
in Albany, New York.2 Hearings were being held across the state by
* J.D. 2010 SUNY Buffalo Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Geography, SUNY
Buffalo. Lewis was also a member of the New York State Environmental Justice Mapping
Group, established by former Governor Patterson, to develop a new method for designating
environmental justice areas. The group dissolved following a change in gubernatorial leader-
ship.
** Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School. The authors would like to thank Barry Boy-
er for his assistance in framing the initial research question. We also appreciate comments re-
ceived from Alice Kaswan and Sarah Krakoff.
1. MINORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONDITIONS ON MINORITY AND Low-
INCOME COMMUNITIES (1992) (reprinting transcripts of hearing participants commenting on
the theme of minority and low-income communities bearing an unfair and disproportionate
burden of health problems caused by environmental factors and executive summary of report
recommendations). At the time of the hearings, Swanston was an attorney with the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and an Adjunct Law Professor at CUNY Law School. She has
since written a number of articles on the topic of environmental justice. See, e.g., Samara
Swanston, Environmental Justice and Environmental Benefits: The Oldest, Most Pernicious Struggle
and Hope for Burdened Communities, 23 VT. L. REV. 545 (1998-1999).
2. Id.MINORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONDITIONS ON MINORITY AND Low-
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the New York State Assembly to explore whether minorities and low-
income communities bear an unfair, disproportional, and increasingly
dangerous burden of health problems caused by environmental fac-
tors.3 According to the Committee:
One only need to take a walk through Brooklyn, Harlem, down-
town Buffalo or Albany to note how many minority and low-income
communities are being adversely affected by poor environmental
conditions, policies, and practices. ... And a visit to any urban area
emergency room will illustrate the physical toll these factors are
taking on community residents.4
One year after publication of the Committee's findings, the New
York State Assembly proposed its first piece of legislation related to
environmental justice.5 The bill on "environmental equity" recog-
nized the disproportionate siting of environmental facilities in minor-
ity and low-income communities, recognized that activities were tak-
ing place on a national level to address this issue, and set the goal of
making the location of environmental facilities (such as incinerators,
landfills, or sewage treatment plants) equitable among all communi-
ties.6 The bill passed in the Assembly but died in the Senate.7 One
year later, the Assembly tried again with an environmental justice
bill, requiring a survey of the location and type of environmental fa-
cilities across the state and consideration of whether the permitting
of such facilities would disproportionately burden a minority or low-
income community.8 This bill, too, died in the Senate.9 The Assem-
bly continued to pass bills on environmental justice year after year for
nearly a decade, only to have each fail in the Senate."' Then, in 2003,




5. A. 7140, 216th Sess. (N.Y. 1993). See RICHARD L. BRODSKY & SHELDON SILVER,
N.Y.S. COMM. ON ENVTL. CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANN. REPORT (1993) 1, 5.
6. A. 7140, 216thSess. (N.Y. 1993).
7. See BRODSKY & SILVER, supra note 5, at 1, 6.
8. A. 7140, 217th Sess. (N.Y. 1994). See RICHARD L. BRODSKY & SHELDON SILVER,
N.Y.S. COMM. ON ENVrL. CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANN. REP. (1994) 1, 5.
9. A. 7140, 217thSess. (N.Y. 1994).
10. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI & SHELDON SILVER, N.Y.S. COMM. ON ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANNUAL REPORT (2002) 1, 7 available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Encon/2002Annual/ (last visited October 24, 2014).
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leased its environmental justice policy, Environmental Justice and Per-
mitting, which the DEC claimed to be "groundbreaking."" The poli-
cy provided guidelines for incorporating environmental justice con-
cerns into the state's environmental permit review process, primarily
through enhanced public participation requirements in low-income
and minority communities.12
Despite this new development, in 2004 the Assembly expanded its
environmental justice legislation by requiring the DEC to publish a
list of areas most adversely impacted by existing environmental haz-
ards, 3 establishing a state environmental justice policy and environ-
mental justice advisory group, 14 and requiring the state's permitting
process to consider whether environmental actions would dispropor-
tionately affect minority or low-income populations.15 Again, each
piece of environmental justice related legislation failed in the Sen-
ate. 6 In the decade to follow the release of the State's policy on envi-
ronmental justice, the Assembly has continued its annual passage of
environmental justice bills, yet each failed in the State Senate. 7
Why is it that the New York State Assembly has not faltered in
its annual passage of environmental justice legislation even after the
state's environmental agency created and implemented what it called
a "groundbreaking" environmental justice policy and despite the
11. N.Y.S. Dep't of Envd. Conservation, Comm. Policy 29, Environmental justice and
Permitting (March 19, 2003), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/36951.html (last
visited October 24, 2014) [hereinafter Policy 29].
12. Id.
13. A. 7862, 227'hSess. (N.Y. 2004).
14. A. 8805,227"hSess. (N.Y. 2004).
15. A. 5938, 227thSess. (N.Y. 2004).
16. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI & SHELDON SILVER, N.Y.S. COMM. ON ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANNUAL REPORT (2004) 1, 7-8.
17. More recent environmental justice related bills passed by the Assembly include one
that would require the State DEC to publish a list of high local environmental impact zones
(A.61 1), one that would create a permanent environmental justice advisory group (A.947), and
one that would add a requirement to the State's Environmental Quality Review Act, requiring a
detailed statement on whether the action would cause a disproportionate or inequitable burden
on a minority or economically distressed community (A.2546). See ROBERT K. SWEENEY &
SHELDON SILVER, N.Y.S. COMM. ON ENVTL. CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANNUAL REPORT
(2012) 1, 4, 9. In 2013, bills included one that would create a permanent environmental justice
advisory group (A.3569) and one that would require the State DEC to publish a list of high lo-
cal environmental impact zones (A.3729). See ROBERT K. SwEENEY, N.Y.S. CoMM. ON
ENVitL. CONSERVATION, N.Y.S. ANN. REP. (2013) 1, 25.
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State Senate's clear resistance? The Assembly may feel the need to
push for legislation despite the policy's presence because the DEC
policy may be ineffective, toothless, or it may be that the Assembly
thinks there is a power to having a policy legislatively enacted. An in-
effective agency policy would not be a shocking thing. After all, we
can all imagine situations where policies are declared simply to take a
stance on an issue or recognize the plight of a particular demographic
group without actually addressing the problem. In our research, we
have found that policies on environmental justice, generally, are more
effective at recognizing the plight of minority and low-income com-
munities in regards to adverse environmental conditions than they
are at actually addressing the problem. By creating a policy on envi-
ronmental justice, a state's policymakers not only publicly recognize
the plight of traditionally disempowered groups, but affirmatively
take a stance on the side of protecting these communities. The provi-
sions of environmental justice policies are most often incapable of ac-
tually addressing the problem at hand, essentially making these poli-
cies more symbolic than authentic.
Several factors can combine to create a situation where policies
are more likely to be symbolic than authentic. Public pressure to reg-
ulate or high levels of uncertainty surrounding an issue can result in
policymakers using symbolic policies to satisfy their constituencies
and, in some cases, to move a topic off the table."8 Or, where solu-
tions are costly (particularly when small groups with strong lobbies
are likely to bear the cost), policymakers may turn to symbolic poli-
cies with hopes that they can avoid the high costs of real change.'9
For example, the DEC's environmental justice policy doesn't actually
redistribute pollution or even require that pollution be reduced in
environmental justice communities."0 In fact, the policy does not even
require that the state environmental agency assess where toxic con-
centrations exist and which communities are impacted.2 The DEC
thereby averts significant administrative costs, and industry escapes
18. See Ingolfur Bliihdorn, Sustaining the Unsustainable: Symbolic Politics and the Politics of
Simulation, 16 ENVTL. POL. 251, 256 (2007).
19. Jens Newig, Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-Deception, 16 ENvWL.
POL. 276, 282 (2007).
20. Policy 29, supra note 11.
21. Id.
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the potential costs related to relocation or pollution control regula-
tions." The State and the environmental agency get credit for em-
bracing pollution control in disadvantaged communities, yet fail to
effectuate any real change. All the while, the general public is duped
into believing that something is actually being done to address the
plight of these communities.
Traditional symbolic politics theory tells us that symbolic policies
have a low impact on effectiveness, often setting forth goals to be
reached but failing to implement the means necessary to achieve the
stated goals.23 Our research adds a prong to the typical symbolic poli-
tics analysis by assessing whether the general public can be so mis-
guided by policymakers that it cannot grasp the idea that a policy is
inherently meaningless when it arises from inconspicuous and vague-
ly stated goals that merely promote an idea.24 At the time New York's
policy originated, the governor and former DEC commissioner tout-
ed the policy to the public as creating "the most effective strategy for
preventing or reducing disproportionately adverse environmental ef-
fects on low income and minority communities."2 The response to
the proposed policy from the environmental community was over-
whelmingly positive.2 6 When the policy was formalized, however, its
goals were reduced to little more than promoting the concept of en-
vironmental justice; it contained no substantive measures to prevent
22. Most notably, governments attempt to avoid changes in the political framework that
might result in relocation decisions by industry with the consequences of job losses. Dirk Mat-
ten, Symbolic Politics in Environmental Regulation: Corporate Strategic Responses, 12 Bus.
STRATEGY & ENV'T 215, 220.
23. The notion of merely symbolic politics was first described by political scientist Murray
Edelman over three decades ago. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS
(1964). There is only a small number of conceptual analyses related to symbolic politics, most
of which can be found in the German and Swiss literature, many of them drawing from earlier
American scholars. Newig, supra note 19. See, e.g., Ingolfur Bliihdorn, supra note 18 (offering a
typology of various categories of symbolic politics); Sander Happaerts, Sustainable Development
and Subnational Governments: Going Beyond Symbolic Politics? 4 ENVTL. DEV. 2 (2012) (evaluating
sustainable development policies under the lens of symbolic politics).
24. This type of symbolic politics can be related to Edelman's description where the
public is deliberately deceived by the politician. See EDELMAN, supra note 23. See also Blidhdorn,
supra note 18, at 257 (categorizing a type of symbolic politics as "the malicious deception of the
unsuspecting and vulnerable public"); see also Newig, supra note 19, at 278 ("Symbolic legisla-
tion deliberately fails to meet its declared objectives.").
25. NYS DEC Press Release, Oct. 4, 1999.
26. See infr'a 42-43.
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or reduce adverse environmental conditions in low-income and mi-
nority communities. 27 We find this practice to be symbolic politics to
the nth degree. The general public was duped into believing that the
State was actually going to address the adverse environmental condi-
tions, when in reality, the State did nothing to achieve the goal it had
widely promoted.
We have organized this Article in the following manner: Part II
provides the history and evolution of environmental justice in the
U.S. and summarizes current state approaches and policies. Part III
describes the concept of symbolic politics, illustrates the reasons
symbolic policies are likely to emerge, and discusses existing methods
for assessing a policy's symbolic nature. Finally, in Part IV, we apply
a symbolic politics analysis to New York's environmental justice poli-
cy, revealing its purely symbolic nature and identifying a potential
new prong for assessing the symbolic nature of policies.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The definition of environmental justice is amorphous, 2 with var-
ious policies, community groups, and scholars assigning the phrase
multiple meanings and interpretations. 9 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA or "the Agency") defines environmental justice as
"the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regard-
less of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the de-
velopment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies."3 The EPA further defines "fair treatment"
to mean that "no group of people, should bear a disproportionate
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from in-
dustrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies."31 Like
27. See Policy 29, supra note 11.
28. Alex Geisinger, The Benefits of Development and Environmental Justice, 37 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 205, 206 n.2 (2012).
29. Aelita Neimanis, Heather Castleden & Daniel Rainham, Examining the Place of Eco-
logical Integrity in Environmental Justice: A Systematic Review, 17 INTT'L J. JUST. &
SUSTAINABILrrY 349, 358 (2012).
30. EPA, EnvironmentalJustice: Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/environmental
justice/basics/index.html (last visited October 28, 2014).
31. Id. A 2012 study of the literature fund a variety of definitions for environmental
justice, although the EPA's definition is most frequently cited. Neimanis, Castleden & Rain-
BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
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the federal government, most state governments define environmen-
tal justice (with some variation) with the statement that "no group of
people" should bear a disproportionate share of society's negative en-
vironmental consequences. 32 These policies do not confer a right on
all people to be free of disparate concentrations of environmental
risk. Rather, they apply the concept of environmental justice in the
sense of equal protection of the law to mean that no group of people,
because of race or other characteristics, should bear an unfair share of
environmental risk or pollution. As a result, environmental justice
consideration in practice has appropriately been limited to low-
income and minority groups. The practice of limiting environmental
justice consideration to low-income and minority groups corresponds
to a historical social movement33 and a long line of research demon-
strating a connection between the disparate concentrations of envi-
ronmental toxins and these demographic groups.34 Studies on envi-
ronmental justice typically assess the proximal relationship between
minority or low-income communities and environmental "bads" such
as air pollution, solid waste landfills, or hazardous waste disposal
sites.35 However, some have evaluated the distribution of environ-
ham, supra note 29, at 358.
32. See Tonya Lewis & Sean Bennett, Environmental Justice & the Demographic Threshold:
Are Benefits Reaching Communities at Risk? 6 ENVTL. JUST. 213 (2013) (reviewing current state
definitions and criteria for designating the environmental justice community).
33. Several high-profile events brought national attention to the grassroots environmen-
tal justice movement. In 1982, a group of protestors used their bodies to block trucks attempt-
ing to dispose of 6,000 tons of PCB-laden soil in a poor, black community in Warren County,
North Carolina. Over 500 people were arrested in the marches and demonstrations protesting
the landfill. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 285
(1994). Around the same time an activist group, People for Community Recovery, formed on
the south side of Chicago over concern surrounding the environmental hazards in its communi-
ty. The group's founder, Hazel Johnson, has been referred to as the "Mother of Environmental
Justice," as she was responsible for spearheading a number of community-centered environ-
mental improvement projects. See Symposium, Environmental Justice: The Merging of Civil Rights
& EnvironmentalActivism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 513 (1993-1994).
34. In 1987, a seminal study was released by the United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial Justice correlating demographic characteristics (race) with the siting of hazardous and
sanitary waste facilities, finding that people of color are 47% percent more likely to live near a
hazardous waste site than white Americans. COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUST., UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987). For a more recent ac-
count of environmental justice articles, see Colleen Reed & Maureen George. Where in the
World is Environmental Justice? 35 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 835 (2011) (evaluating
research articles on environmental justice from the past decade).
35. These studies are not without scrutiny. They are often criticized for the malleability
1831
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mental "goods" such as green spaces, parks, and clean air,3 6 and have
applied a discursive use of the term environment to include the urban
areas where we live, work, and play.37
This myriad of interpretations of what environmental justice in-
cludes is problematic as the confusion contributes to questions re-
garding the efficacy of the environmental justice movement. Are the
goals too diffuse to be meaningful? Is environmental justice simply
the right to be free from disparate concentrations of environmental
toxins or is it more complex, calling for equal distributions of green
spaces and playgrounds? The literature on the topic of environmental
justice has failed to be critical of these issues and has not adequately
questioned the efficacy of a broad definition of the environmental
justice movement.38 The movement's decentralized, grassroots char-
acter also impedes its capacity to become an influential actor in the
national decision-making context.39 Becoming influential in the com-
plex scientific decision-making processes surrounding environmental
justice policy decisions takes technical and financial resources, some-
of the study outcome depending on the size of the area studied. Juliana Maantay, Mapping Envi-
ronmental Injustices: Pitfalls & Potential of Geographic Information Systems in Assessing Environmen-
tal Health, & Equity, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES Supp. n. 2 161, 165 (2002). See, e.g.,
William Bowen, Mark Sailing, Kingsley Haynes, & Ellen Cryan, Toward Environmental Justice:
Spatial Equity in Ohio & Cleveland, 85 ANNALS AM. ASS'N GEOGRAPHERS 641 (1995) (finding a
strong association between minority groups and the distribution of hazardous sites when exam-
ining the relationship on a statewide level, but an inverse correlation when examining the rela-
tionship within smaller census tracts). In addition, identified correlations between demographic
groups and the location of environmental harms are criticized for ignoring potential exogenous
factors such as an expected increase in the number of hazardous sites within urban areas and the
secondary effects of contagious industry, including the influence of hazardous facilities on near-
by housing prices, which result in lower-income residents. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L.J.
1383 (1994) (evaluating the possibility that areas containing concentrations of least undesirable
land uses (LULUS) attracted low-income and minority residents due to cheap housing).
36. See Paul Mohai, David Pellow, & J. Timmons Roberts, Environmental Justice, 34
ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCES 405 (2009) (reviewing and discussing the application of criti-
cal race theory for understanding environmental injustices).
37. Robert Bullard, Leveling the Playing Field through Environmental Justice, 23 VT. L.
REV. 453, 459 (1998).
38. See Robert J. Brulle & David N. Pellow, Environmental Justice: Human Health & En-
vironmentalInequalities, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 103, 118 (2006) (discussing the theoretical
literature on environmental justice, the impact of the environmental justice movement, and the
role of federal and state governments in addressing environmental inequalities).
39. Alice Kaswan. Environmental Justice & Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.
REV. 149, 158 (2013).
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thing environmental justice groups typically do not have, and this
process is already heavily influenced by better-funded stakeholders.'
Ideally, the political approach to environmental justice would consid-
er "equity in the distribution of environmental risk, [recognize] the
diversity.., and experiences in affected communities" and enhance
public "participation in the political processes which create and man-
age environmental policy."
41
A. The Federal Approach to Enviornmental Justice
The federal government began to respond to environmental jus-
tice concerns with widespread action in 1992 with the creation of the
EPA's Office of Environmental Justice42 and the National Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Council in 1993 .41 President Clinton then is-
sued Executive Order 12898 in 1994, directing all federal agencies to
consider environmental justice in their agency activities affecting
low-income and minority communities. 4 The accompanying Presi-
dential Memorandum emphasized the importance of using the exist-
ing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental re-
view process for promoting environmental justice and offered six
principles for assessing disproportionate impacts of federal actions on
low-income, minority, and tribal populations. 45 The EPA has failed
40. Eileen Guana, Environmental Law, Civil Rights & Sustainabiliy: Three Frameworks for
Environmental Justice, 19J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 34, 50 (2012).
41. David Schlosherg, Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political
Theories, 13 ENWTrL. POL. 517, 517 (2004).
42. EPA, Environmental Justice: Basic Information, Background, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited October 24, 2014). The
Office was named the "Office of Environmental Equity" until the name was changed to "Office
of Environmental Justice" in 1994.
43. EPA, National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/environmentaljustice/nejac/index.html (last visited October 24, 2014).
44. Exec Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). In 2011, 17 cabinet members and
White House officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Executive Order 12898,
formally recommitting their agencies to environmental justice and to the development of sup-
porting procedures. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE
AND ExEcUTIVE ORDER 12898, available at http://epa.gov/environmentaljustice/
resources/publications/interagency/ej-mou-2011-08.pdf (last vistied October 24, 2014). The
Memorandum requires that each federal agency review and update (as applicable) its environ-
mental justice strategy, post the strategy on the agency's webpage, and provide annual progress
reports on the agency's implementation of Executive Order 12898.
45. Memorandum from President Clinton, March 1994, available at http://www.epa.gov/
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to follow the Executive Order, has failed to protect minority and low-
income populations,' has failed to provide overburdened areas direct
relief from pollution,47 and has not sufficiently monitored progress
toward environmental justice. 4 Making matters worse, the Agency
deviated from the Executive Order's focus in 2002 when it redirected
its policy toward a "non-affirmative action" approach, stating that the
Agency's environmental justice program was not "designed specifical-
ly to address the concerns of minority communities and/or low-
income communities [and] to the contrary, environmental justice be-
longs to all Americans. ' '49
Most recently, however, the EPA has recommitted to addressinge
higher burdens of environmental exposure and risk in low-income
and minority communities as part of Plan EJ 2014.0 The new strate-
gy has five cross-agency focus areas: (1) incorporating environmental
justice into rulemaking; (2) considering environmental justice in
permitting; (3) advancing environmental justice through compliance
and enforcement; (4) supporting community-based action programs;
and (5) fostering administration-wide action on environmental jus-
environmentaljustice/resources/policy/ej guidance nepa-epa0498.pdf (last visited October 24,
2014) (outlining the process for the recommended inclusion of how agencies will address any
significant and adverse effects of proposed federal actions on low-income and minority popula-
tions as part of their mitigation strategies outlined in their environmental assessments or envi-
ronmental impact statements). Under NEPA, federal agencies must prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement for every "major Federal action.., significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2008). In preparing an EIS , agencies must consider
both impacts on the natural or physical environment and related social, cultural, and economic
impacts. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.14.
46. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, EPA NEEDS TO CONSISTENTLY
IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2004)
[hereinafter OIG REPORT] (describing problems and recommending corrective actions in re-
gards to the EPA's failure to fully implement Executive Order 12898 and to address minori-
ty/low-income populations).
47. Geisinger, supra note 28, at 217.
48. Sarah Fredericks, Monitoring Environmental Justice, 4 J. ENVTL. JUST. 63 (2011).
49. OIG REPORT, supra note 46, at 10.
50. Plan EJ 20014 does not evaluate the distribution of environmental toxins or purport
to reduce concentrations in low-income and minority communities. See generally OFFICE OF
ENvTh. JUST., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN EJ 2014 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/plan-ej- 2014 /plan-ej- 2 011-09.pdf (last
visited October 24, 2014) (describing a four-year plan to strengthen efforts to promote and in-
tegrate environmental justice into the EPA's programs).
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tice." The new strategy does not evaluate the spatial distribution of
toxic facilities or limit pollution in overburdened areas.52
B. State Approaches
The development of state policies on environmental justice coin-
cided with the federal response to environmental justice concerns.
Connecticut was the first state to declare such a policy in 1993."
Connecticut's legislatively enacted plan focuses primarily on in-
creased opportunities for public involvement in the permitting of ac-
tivities adversely affecting the environment. Specifically, applicants
proposing certain facilities in designated environmental justice com-
munities must file meaningful public participation plans with the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. 4 A number
of other states developed policies on environmental justice similar to
Connecticut's during the late 1990s and early 2000s."s As of 2014,
forty-one states have environmental justice related statutes, regula-
tions, or initiatives.56 Methods for evaluating and addressing envi-
ronmental justice vary by state, although most limit consideration to
minority or low-income populations.57
The criteria for determining what constitutes minority or low-
income status varies by state. In Massachusetts, a community is con-
sidered a "minority community" where 25% of the residents are mi-
nority." In New York, a minority community is composed of 51.1%
51. Id. at 8-20.
52. Id.
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a (2009).
54. The policy applies to hazardous waste facilities, solid waste facilities, medical waste
incinerators, and any major source of air pollution. Id. at § a(2).
55. For a comprehensive review of current state programs, see A.B.A. & HASTINGS
COLL. OF THE LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF
LEGISLATION, POLICIES, AND CASES (Steven Bonorris ed., 4th ed. 2010), available at
http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/ejreport-fourthedition.pdf (last visited October 24,
2014).
56. Stephen Bonorris & Nicholas Targ, Environmental Justice in the Laboratories of De-
mocracy, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 44 (2010).
57. See Lewis & Bennett, supra note 32.
58. Massachusetts Executive Office of Env't Affairs, Environmental Justice Policy (Oct. 9,
2002) available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/ej/ej-policy-english.pdf (last vistited Oc-
tober 24, 2014) [hereinafter Mass. Pol.].
minority residents in an urban area or 33.8% in a rural area.59 For
low-income status, Connecticut identifies 59 communities where
30% of a census block group is 200% below the federal poverty lev-
el.6" In Massachusetts, a low-income community occurs where the
median household income is at or below 65% of the state-wide
mean.6 In addition to environmental justice consideration for minor-
ity and low-income groups, additional groups considered include
those who are "foreign born" or "lacking in English proficiency. '62
Demographic thresholds like these are problematic. They bifurcate
areas into either an environmental justice community or a non-
environmental justice community, without regard to the distribution
of environmental hazards.63 Demographic composition defines en-
viornmental justice communities in every state-not the environ-
mental or public health condition of the area.
The spectrum of state activities dedicated to addressing envi-
ronmental justice is broad. Stephen Bonorris and Nicholas Targ cat-
egorize three primary approaches: the internal management ap-
proach, the substantive approach, and the public participation
approach.A Most states implement a combination of the three ap-
proaches.6" The internal management approach is akin to the direc-
tives of Executive Order 12898 and occurs where state agencies are
instructed to consider environmental justice in their activities affect-
ing designated environmental justice communities. Under this ap-
proach, environmental justice concerns are integrated into the bu-
59. Policy 29, supra note 1. New York State applied the EPA Region 2 approach for de-
termining demographic thresholds. NYS ENVTL. JUST. ADVISORY GROUP 2002 REPORT,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NYS DEPT OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION 9, 10 (2002),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits-ej-operations-pdf/ejfinalrpt.pdf (last vistited October 24,
2014) [hereinafter Advisory Group Recommendations]. The method applied statistical analyses
to population data to determine where the natural breaks occurred between minority/non-
minority and low-income/non low-income groups. Separate criteria were developed for urban
areas where a greater number of minority and low-income residents was present. U.S. EPA
REGION 2 GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSES § 2.2.2,
http://www.epa.gov/region2/ej/guidelines.htm#step2 (last visited October 24, 2014).
60. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a (2009).
61. Mass. Pol., supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. Lewis & Bennett, supra note 322, at 217.
64. Bonorris & Targ, supra note 56, at 44-46.
65. For a thorough evaluation of state approaches, see Lewis & Bennett, supra note 32.
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reaucratic system and might include the formation of interagency
workgroups, the publishing of policy guidelines, and educating deci-
sion makers on the process.66 Also along these lines, some states have
developed boards or committees to evaluate the adequacy of existing
state law to address environmental justice issues. South Carolina de-
veloped an advisory group to study environmental justice practices in
the state's agencies, 67 and New Jersey developed an advisory council
to advise the state environmental agency on issues of environmental
justice.68
The substantive approach includes activities designed to avoid
disparate impacts of environmental toxins in particular communi-
ties. 69 Although no state policy directly limits the release of environ-
mental pollutants (and therefore, arguably, no state is currently tak-
ing the substantive tack), some states incorporate environmental
justice into their permitting schemes, including New York, Massa-
chusetts, and New Mexico. New York requires the permit applicant
to complete an enhanced review of the area surrounding the pro-
posed project when applying for a permit.7" In Massachusetts, pro-
jects within one mile of an environmental justice area necessitate en-
hanced analysis of impacts and mitigation measures.71 New Mexico's
environmental justice policy directs all state agencies to use available
environmental and public health data for environmental justice
communities when "determining siting, permitting, compliance, en-
forcement, and remediation of existing and proposed industrial and
commercial facilities."72
The public participation approach is meant to create better-
informed administrative decisions and to grant the environmental
66. Id.
67. S.C. ENVTL. JUSTICE COMM., FINAL REPORT, available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/archives/dheclEJAdvisoryFinalReportCombined.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2014).
68. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Office of Environmental Jus-
tice, Environmental Justice Advisory Council, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/ej/ejcouncil.htmI (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014).
69. Bonorris & Targ, supra note 56, at 45.
70. See Policy 29, supra note 11 at V(D); Mass. Pol., supra note 58.
71. Mass. Pol., supra note 58, at 8.
72. N.M. Exec. Order No. 2005-056 (Nov. 4, 2005), http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/
Justice/EO_2005_056.pdf.
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justice community the opportunity to participate in the environmen-
tal decision-making process." States often create public participation
strategies alongside substantive and internal management processes.7 4
Typically, public participation measures apply either to general
communication regarding environmental conditions in these com-
munities or to the process surrounding specific permitting actions.75
Some states require project applicants to develop formal public par-
ticipation plans.76 In New York, project applicants must outline how
they will inform the community of the proposed action and how they
will address specific community concerns.77 Sometimes, the permit
applicant or developer is required to hold informal public meetings to
provide residents with information about the proposed project.7" In
Pennsylvania, permit applicants are required to meet with town offi-
cials to evaluate the need for a community benefit agreement, where
the developer and the impacted community agree to certain terms
and conditions in exchange for the community's support of the de-
veloper's proposed project.79
73. Bonorris & Targ, supra note 56, at 44-46; see Ryan Holifield, EnvironmentalJustice as
Recognition and Participation in Risk Assessment: Negotiating and Translating Health Risk at a Super-
fund Site in Indian Country, 102 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 591 (2012).
74. See, e.g., Policy 29, supra note 11.
75. General communication activities include the development of a direct contact person
or environmental justice office or development of a hotline for residents to call with environ-
mental concerns. See, e.g., TX COMM. ENVTL. QUALITY, Environmental Equity Program (Feb.
2013), available at http://www.tceq.texas.gov/agency/hearings/envequ.html. Direct communica-
tion measures are taken during specific projects and may include activities such as the public
posting of project-specific information or meeting with community leaders. See, e.g., Policy 29,
supra note 11, at (lI)(b)(1).
76. See, e.g., Policy 29, supra note 11, at (JII)(b)(l).; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a (2009).
77. Policy 29, supra note 11.
78. See, e.g., PA Dept. of Envtl. Prot. Policy Office, Envtl. Justice Pub. Participation
Policy (2004) 012-0501-002, available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/
Get/Version-48671/012-0501-002.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); Policy 29, supra note 11, at
(V)(D)(3).
79. PA Dept. of Envtl. Prot. Policy Office, Envtl. Justice Pub. Participation Policy
(2004) 012-0501-002, available at http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Version-
48671/012-0501-002.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). For an analysis of community benefit
agreements and environmental justice, see Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New
Local Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme? 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010).
According to Been, the benefits offered under a community benefit agreement vary and may
include commitments for hiring local laborers, assuring a certain percentage of housing con-
struction will be low-income, or a promise to protect/improve the environment. In return, the
community promises to abstain from any legal or procedural challenges to the action. Id. at 5-6.
Although enhanced public participation measures can arguably
limit future pollution-emitting activities through active community
involvement in the permitting process, the most effective means for
limiting pollution in these overburdened communities would be for
states to limit the amount of toxic releases. However, no state cur-
rently does so under its environmental justice policy. In fact, states do
not even calculate where toxic concentrations are occurring or con-
sider disparate health effects under their environmental justice poli-
cies."0
C. New York State's Policy
There is no New York State statute on environmental justice, no
state regulation, and no executive order.81 There is, however, an envi-
ronmental justice policy developed and executed by the state's envi-
ronmental agency. In 1998, parties concerned about alleged envi-
ronmental disparities affecting minority and low-income
communities met with executive staff from the DEC,82 claiming: (1)
there was a lack of public access to information regarding environ-
mental conditions in these communities; (2) the permitting process
failed to address disproportionate adverse environmental impacts; (3)
there was an inequitable distribution of green benefits such as open
spaces and grant funds; and (4) there was a pressing need for more ef-
fective and consistent enforcement of conservation law violators.83 In
response84 on October 4, 1999, New York Governor George Pataki
and DEC Commissioner John Cahill announced the creation of a
New York State Program to address environmental justice concerns
and community participation in the state's environmental permitting
Although rising in popularity, these agreements are relatively new and the net benefits to the
parties involved are not completely known. Id. at 6.
80. See Lewis and Bennett, supra note 32.
81. The State Assembly has repeatedly attempted to pass legislation on the issue of envi-
ronmental justice. See supra section I; See, e.g., SWEENEY & SILVER, supra note 17, at 4, 12.
82. Erin M. Crotty, New York's Model for Environmental Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. 11, 11
(2003).
83. Policy 29, supra note 11, at II.
84. Id.
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process.15 A 1999 EPA environmental justice grant supplemented
program development funding.86
The first steps in the development of the state program included
the naming of an Environmental Justice Coordinator, the creation of
an Office of Environmental Justice, and the establishment of an Envi-
ronmental Justice Advisory Group to develop recommendations for
the DEC's forthcoming environmental justice policy.87 The Advisory
Group held meetings in cities across the state, including Syracuse,
Buffalo, New York City, Albany, and the Onondaga Nation, to listen
to the concerns of minority and low-income communities, as well as
others affected by environmental issues.88 The Advisory Group sub-
mitted its findings to the DEC in early 2002. In a nutshell, the Advi-
sory Group recommended that the DEC (1) define environmental
justice communities geographically by evaluating the distribution of
toxic releases and demographic data, (2) enhance public notice and
participation procedures in relation to environmental permitting de-
cisions in these communities, and (3) enhance the state's permitting
procedures for these communities under the State Environmental
Quality Review Act.89
In August 2002, the DEC released a draft of its environmental
justice policy, which it based on the Advisory Group's Reportand the
public comments that followed it.90 The DEC then held a public
comment period on the draft policy.91 On March 19, 2003, DEC is-
sued its final policy, Policy 29 "Environmental Justice and Permit-
85. NYS DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
86. The EPA State & Tribal Environmental Justice Grant addressed these elements: (1)
formation of an environmental justice Advisory Group; (2) development of an environmental
justice permit policy with guidelines for addressing environmental justice permitting issues; (3)
enhancement of the DEC website; (4) conducting a series of public meetings throughout the
state to identify environmental justice concerns; and (5) recommendations for a strategic envi-
ronmental justice plan. See ENVT'L JUSTICE ADVISORY GRP., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
N.Y.S. DEC ENvT'LJUSTsCE PROGRAM (2002) at 2, http://www.dec.ny.gov/
docs/permitsej-operationspdf/ejfinalrpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
87. Id.
88. The Advisory Group was chaired by the DEC's Environmental Justice Coordinator
and consisted of eighteen appointed members, including federal, state, and local health officials,
environmental justice advocates, environmentalists, a Native American representative, and an
academician. See id.
89. Id.
90. Policy 29, rupra note 11.
91. Id. § 1.
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ting."92 The policy defines environmental justice as "the fair treat-
ment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race,
color, or income with respect to the development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies."93
It further defines "fair treatment" as "no group of people, including a
racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportion-
ate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of
federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies."94 Under the
policy, environmental justice communities are those where minority
residents comprise 51.1% of the population in an urban area and
33.8% of the population in a rural area,95 or where low-income resi-
dents make up 23.59% of the total population.96 Communities meet-
ing these demographic thresholds are defined geographically
(mapped) using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and serve as
the foundation for the state's environmental justice policy.97 There is
no consideration for the distribution of toxins or public health in this
designation, and all of the state's environmental justice activities spe-
cifically target (and are only applicable to) these predetermined
communities.98
92. Id.
93. Id. § I(A)(2).
94. Id.
95. Id. § IIl(A)(6). Note, the U.S. Census 'block group' is used as the area for determina-
tion, which typically contains between 250 and 500 housing units.
96. Id. § III(A)(3).
97. Id. §V(B)(2).
98. The obvious result of the demographic threshold approach is no consideration for
disproportionate burdens on environmental justice communities, thereby failing to actually ad-
dress the substantive nature of environmental justice efforts. A less obvious implication is that
communities falling outside of the specified criteria cannot be considered for environmental
justice efforts, regardless of existing environmental conditions or toxic concentrations. New
York State Senator George Maziarz commented on the issue, stating, "Unless the NYS DEC's
environmental justice policy corrects its basic assumptions that environmental injustice happens
only to minority or poor communities or if it does recognize this, continues to pursue policy
that denies equal protection to these other burdened communities, any report, policy, or regu-
lation will lack legitimacy." Maziaraz argued on behalf of Niagara County, one of the most en-
vironmentally burdened communities in the nation, as it is the location of the infamous Love
Canal and other environmental tragedies that eventually led to the development of the federal
Superfund program. He refers to communities burdened with heavy levels of radioactive and
chemical contamination, as well as with the only commercial hazardous waste disposal facility in
the northeast, noting that these communities are not necessarily low-income or minority, but
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Environmental justice "activities" generally fall into one of two
categories: either incorporating environmental justice concerns into
the environmental review process or enhancing public participation
in low-income and minority populations.99 Policy 29 also outlines a
number of activities to be developed post-policy enactment. We dis-
cuss each category of activities below.
D. Incorporating Environmental Justice into the Permitting Process
In New York, the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA) requires state agencies and units of local government to
consider environmental factors in planning, permit review, and deci-
sion-making processes.0 The SEQRA process requires that all agen-
cies, including the state environmental agency (DEC), complete an
environmental assessment to identify and mitigate significant envi-
ronmental impacts resulting from the projects or activities ("ac-
tions")1 °1 that they undertake, fund, or approve (including issuance of
environmental permits)." 2 These environmental assessments are
neither are they wealthy. See Letter from George Maziarz, New York State Senator, to NYS
DEC Office of Environmental Justice (March 15, 2005), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits-ej-operationspdf/sengeorgemaziarz.pdf (last visited Oct.
24, 2014). Despite the argument that environmental justice policies should be expanded to in-
clude demographic groups outside of the traditionally designated minority and low-income
groups, there is an inherent value in the focus on these groups as a result of the long, sad histo-
ry of housing toxic facilities in these politically disempowered communities.
99. See generally Policy 29, supra note 11.
100. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103; 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617. The State Environ-
mental Quality Review Act is SEQRA, whereas the process for review under the Act is known
as SEQR (State Environmental Quality Review).
101. N.Y ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105 (4); N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(b). Certain minor
actions and actions whose environmental impacts are addressed by other statutes are exempt
from the SEQR process, including enforcement proceedings or the maintenance or repair of
existing structures. N.Y ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(5).
102. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103; 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617. The Legislature has
made SEQR self-enforcing. That is, each agency is responsible for ensuring it is in compliance
with the requirements of the act. There is no "SEQR police." While the DEC is charged with
issuing regulations regarding the SEQR process, the DEC has no authority to review the im-
plementation of the process by other state agencies. Compliance is "enforced" only through
citizen suits (or threats thereof) alleging that an agency did not comply with SEQRA. Although
the DEC provides informal guidance on how the SEQR process should be followed, state and
local agencies are expected to consult with their own legal counsel to ensure compliance. See
N.Y.S. Dep't of Envd. Conservation, SEQR, Environment Impact Assessment in New York State,
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/357.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
standardized through the use of an Environmental Assessment Form
that provides necessary information for determining whether the
proposed action will have a significant impact on the environment."'
The basic Environmental Assessment Form comes in either a short
form or a longer, "full" form. The full form is used by project appli-
cants where the activity under review is more likely than not to have a
significant impact on the environment (called Type I actions). 1°4
Where an action or activity has been predetermined by the State
DEC not to result in a significant environmental impact (called Type
II actions), no environmental assessment (and thus no Environmental
Assessment Form) is required."' 5 The short form is used only when
an activity is neither a Type I nor Type II action and is therefore an
"unlisted action."106 If after reviewing either the short or full form the
action agency determines that the action will have a significant ad-
verse environmental impact, the agency or project applicant must
complete an environmental impact statement addressing all potential
impacts, potential alternatives, and proposed methods for mitiga-
tion. 10 7
The DEC issues several types of environmental permits, includ-
ing those for mining and land reclamation, wastewater discharge to
surface and groundwater, facility permits for air emissions, solid and
103. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.1(c). For access to the SEQRA Forms and guidance documents
for applicants, see N.Y.S. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 102.
104. SEQRA contains a list of actions predetermined to fall under the category of Type I
actions, including, for example, the adoption of a municipality's land-use plan, the sale or trans-
fer of one hundred or more contiguous acres of land by a state or local agency, and large-scale
projects such as the construction of a facility with more than 100,000 square feet. 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 617.4 (b)(1-11). Agencies can also adopt their own list of predetermined Type I action in ad-
dition to those outlined in SEQRA. § 617.4(2).
105. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6(1)(i). SEQRA contains a list of actions predetermined to fall
under the category of Type II actions, including: the maintenance or repair of an existing facili-
ty involving no substantial changes, agricultural management practices, and repaving of existing
highways. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(c). Each agency may also adopt its own list of Type II ac-
tions as long as the action will not have a significant impact on the environment. 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 617.5(b).
106. An agency may instead require or use a full environmental assessment form for un-
listed actions if the short form would not provide sufficient information to determine the signif-
icance of potential environmental impacts. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.6(a)(3).
107. For EIS content, see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(b). When the agency has completed a
draft EIS or when a draft EIS prepared by a project applicant is adequate for public review, the
DEC will determine whether to hold a public hearing on the action. In making the determina-
tion, the DEC considers several factors. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(a)(4).
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hazardous-waste permits, and water-withdrawal permits. While
SEQRA applies to these permit issuances, the state's environmental
justice policy only requires the DEC to incorporate environmental
justice into its decision-making processes for certain actions." 8 These
include major projects and major modifications under the State Pol-
lutant Discharge System (applies to the discharge of industrial waste
and sewage into bodies of water),' 09 air pollution control under the
state's Air Pollution Control Act (applies to major sources of air pol-
lutants),"0 solid waste management and resource recovery facilities, 1 '
industrial hazardous waste management,112 and the siting of industrial
hazardous waste facilities.'13
Upon receipt of an application for a permit covering these ac-
tions, the DEC conducts a preliminary screening to identify whether
the proposed project is in or near an environmental justice communi-
ty. If no environmental justice community is identified, the pro-
posed action is determined to not likely affect an environmental jus-
108. Policy 29, supra note 11, at (V)(A). The Advisory Group had recommended that the
policy apply to major projects under sixteen of the state's environmental regulatory programs,
see ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 59, at 4-5, yet the DEC only applied
the policy to five programs.
109. The State Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) is an EPA-approved program for
the control of wastewater and storm water discharges in accordance with the Clean Water Act.
Actions requiring permits and subject to the state's environmental justice policy include the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes into the waters of the state. Policy 29, su-
pra note 11, at (V)(A)(i). "Other" wastes include garbage and refuse. N.Y. ENVTL CONSERV.
LAW § 17-0701(1)(a).
110. N.Y. ENVrL CONSERv. LAW § 19-0101. The DEC is the state agency that carries
out both the state and federal air pollution and monitoring programs. Federal law requires the
DEC to submit a state implementation plan that demonstrates how state air pollution control
programs will be carried out to reduce pollution and to ensure that air contaminant levels are in
compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (42 U.S.C. §§ 7410). The DEC's
Division of Air Resources administers permits to applicants. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 201. Only Title
V facility permit actions (facilities judged to be major) are subject to the state's environmental
justice policy. Policy 29, supra note 11, at (V)(A)(ii). This includes stationary sources that directly
emit 100 tons per year or more of any air pollutant or air contaminant regulated under the Act
or 10 tons per year of a hazardous air pollutant. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 201-2.1(b)(21).
111. In addition to major projects or modifications, this includes a limited number of mi-
nor modifications. See Policy 29, supra note 11, at (V)(A)(iii).
112. Id. at(V)(A)(iv).
113. Id. at(V)(A)(v).
114. Id. at (V)(B)(1). The determination of whether the community is an environmental
justice community is used using GIS mapping and census block data to identify whether the
community meets the policy thresholds.
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tice area and the permit-review process continues independent of the
environmental-justice policy requirements.115 However, if an envi-
ronmental-justice community is identified,116 the policy requirements
must be incorporated into the process and project applicants must be
provided with relevant information on environmental justice."'
Policy 29 requires project applicants to complete a Full Environ-
mental Assessment Form for all unlisted actions, that is, those that do
not fall into the predetermined categories of Type I (more likely to
result in a significant environmental impact) or Type 1I (determined
not to result in a significant impact)."' This is distinguishable from
the standard SEQRA procedures, which only require agencies or pro-
ject applicants to complete the Short Environmental Assessment
Form for unlisted projects. The short form is four pages and appli-
cants respond to twenty questions regarding the proposed project and
its anticipated effects." 9 For example, applicants must respond as to
whether the project is consistent with current zoning standards,
whether it requires a permit or agency approval, and other questions
surrounding the basic infrastructure (water lines, etc.) required for
the project."20 The full form, required for all unlisted actions under
Policy 29, is twenty-three pages and consists of two parts. Like the
short form, the full form requires applicants to complete a series of
questions surrounding the project's anticipated infrastructure needs
and zoning requirements.21 However, the content is more substan-
tive in that applicants must also respond to a number of community-
specific questions related to the project setting, such as which school
district the project site is located in, which police serve the site, and
115. Id. at(V)(B)(2).
116. Id. at (V)(B)(2) and (V)(C). For a determination that a proposed action will affect an
environmental justice community, a substantial amount of the census block identified as an en-
vironmental justice community must fall within the affected area.
117. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (V)(B-M).
118. Id. § (E).
119. Short Environmental Assessment Form, http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/
permits.ej operations pdf/seaf.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
120. Id.
121. See Full Environmental Assessment Form, Part I, Project and Setting, Appendix A to
6 N.Y.C.R.R. 617.20, http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits-ej-operations-pdf/feafpartl.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
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whether there are nearby parks.'22 The applicant must also respond to
specific questions regarding the anticipated effects of the project on
traffic, lighting, noise, odors, and impacts on transportation routes
such as pedestrian or bike lanes.12 3
When identifying potential project impacts, although applicants
are instructed to "consider the possibility for long-term and cumula-
tive impacts as well as direct impacts,"'1 4 the applicant (or the DEC in
its review of the form) is not required to consider existing sources of
pollution, localized public health issues, or to even identify the com-
munity as an environmental-justice community. 2 Using the infor-
mation provided, the DEC will then determine whether the project is
likely to have a significant environmental impact.126 Examples of
where the agency might find a potential significant impact include a
substantially adverse change in existing air quality, ground or surface
water quality or quantity, the removal or destruction of large quanti-
ties of vegetation or fauna, the creation of a hazard to human health,
or the impairment of the character or quality of a community or
neighborhood.'27
If it is determined that a significant environmental impact is likely
to occur as a result of the project, the project applicant128 must com-
plete an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS").12' The format of
the EIS is flexible, but the SEQRA process requires a number of ele-
122. Id.
123. See Full Environmental Assessment Form, Part II, Identification of Potential Project




126. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.7(c)(1)(i-xii).
127. Id.
128. The project applicant (sponsor) has the option to request that the DEC prepare the
draft EIS. In the event that this is the case, the applicant may be charged a fee. 6 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 617.9(a)(1).
129. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (V)(H). This is standard SEQRA procedure following a
DEC determination of a potential significant environmental impact for any Type I or unlisted
action. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.7. An EIS can be labeled as draft, final, supplemental, or gener-
ic. A draft EIS is the version of the EIS that the lead agency (the DEC) makes available for pub-
lic review and comment. In a final EIS, the DEC responds to the substantive comments or is-
sues identified during the public review period. A lead agency may require a supplemental EIS
to address issues that were not addressed or were inadequately addressed in either the draft or
the final EIS. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(n).
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ments, including the purpose of the proposed action; the public needs
and benefits for the action, including social and economic considera-
tions; a concise description of the environmental setting of the area
to be affected; an evaluation of the potential significant adverse envi-
ronmental impacts including cumulative impacts and other associated
environmental impacts; a description of mitigation measures; and a
description and evaluation of the range of reasonable alternatives, in-
cluding alternative sites for the project, size or magnitude, technolo-
gy, and timing. 3° For environmental justice areas, Policy 29 requires
the EIS to identify the environmental justice area to be affected, de-
scribe the existing environmental burden on the area, and evaluate
the additional burden of significant environmental impact on the
community.13' The DEC will identify the scope or breadth of analysis
on an individual project basis.'32 When the DEC has determined that
the draft EIS is adequate for public review, SEQRA grants the agency
discretion as to whether to hold public hearings on the proposed ac-
tion.'33 However, in the case of an environmental justice community,
Policy 29 requires that the DEC conduct a public hearing where a
draft EIS includes an evaluation of additional burdens on an envi-
ronmental justice community.'34 After the issuance of a hearing no-
tice, Policy 29 grants the project applicant and the public access to the
DEC Office of Hearings and Mediation Services for alternative dis-
pute resolution.'35 When the resolution consists of enforceable per-
mit conditions, the DEC incorporates the conditions into the permit.
When the resolution consists of conditions beyond the enforceable
130. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(b)(5), for a complete list of information required.
131. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (V)J).
132. Id.
133. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(a)(4). In determining whether to hold a hearing, the lead
agency is to consider the degree of interest in the action shown by the public or involved agen-
cies, whether significant adverse environmental impacts have been identified, the adequacy of
mitigation measures and alternatives proposed, and the extent to which a public hearing can aid
the agency's decision-making process.
134. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (V)(K). SEQRA outlines the process for the public hearing.
Notice must be published at least 14 days in advance of the hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in the area of the potential impacts of the action, and the hearing must commence
no less than 15 calendar days or no more than 60 calendar days after the filing of the notice of
completion of the draft EIS. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.9(a)(4)(i-ii).
135. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (V)(L).
authority of the DEC, the non-DEC parties are encouraged to en-
gage in a private agreement enforceable by those parties.136
To summarize the modifications to the DEC's permitting pro-
cess under Policy 29, the DEC must: (1) require that the project appli-
cant complete a Full Environmental Assessment in lieu of the shorter
form for all unlisted actions (those not predetermined likely or not
likely to pose a significant environmental impact); (2) require the in-
corporation of environmental justice into the EIS where one is re-
quired; (3) require a public hearing where the EIS evaluates the po-
tential burden on an environmental-justice community; and (4) offer
mediation between parties in certain circumstances.
E. Public Participation
Policy 29 requires applicants proposing certain activities 137 or pro-
jects located in identified environmental-justice communities to de-
velop and implement enhanced public-participation plans. The per-
mit applicant is required (1) to submit to the DEC a written plan that
identifies stakeholders in the proposed action, including residents ad-
jacent to the proposed site as well as local elected officials and com-
munity-based organizations; (2) to distribute and post written "plain
language" information on the proposed action, permit a review pro-
cess, and translate these materials for non-English speaking stake-
holders where appropriate; (3) to hold public informational meetings
to keep the public informed throughout the permit review process;
and (4) to establish accessible document repositories within the
community or on the internet to make pertinent project information
available.'38 The permit applicant is also required to submit reports to
the DEC throughout the process summarizing community concerns,
progress made towards plan implementation, and final certification of
plan compliance.' 39 In addition to the requirements for permit appli-
cants, Policy 29 establishes more general public participation
136. Id.
137. Included activities or projects are those that affect the permitting process, including
the discharge of water pollutants, air pollutants, solid waste management, hazardous waste
management, and the siting of hazardous waste facilities. See id. § V(D)(1)(1-4).
138. Id.
139. Id. § (V)(D).
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measures, including the translation of informational documents relat-
ed to the environmental review process ' and the development of a
toll-free environmental justice hotline to enable public access to the
Office of Environmental Justice.14'
F. Policy 29's Future Objectives
Policy 29 also outlines a number of activities to be conducted
post-2003. 42 Within three months of the policy's effective date,
DEC staff was to be educated on environmental justice and the DEC
Office of Environmental Justice was to develop a curriculum and
begin implementing a formal training to affected staff.143 Six months
after the policy's effective date, the DEC was to identify and begin
conducting workshops to educate the public on environmental jus-
tice, the permitting process, and the agency's environmental justice
policy.'" More substantive directives include conducting supple-
mental compliance and enforcement inspections of regulated facilities
in environmental justice areas (where there "is reason to believe that
such facilities are not operating in compliance with the Environmen-
tal Conservation Law") 145 and the creation of two work groups "to
assist DEC to develop and incorporate critical information into the
DEC environmental review process."'" The first group, later named
the Disproportionate Adverse Environmental Impact Group, was to
develop recommendations for conducting a disproportionate adverse
140. Id. § (I(1)(11). Documents translated include "What is SEQRA"; "A Citizen's
Guide to SEQR"; "The SEQR Cookbook"; "How to Apply for a DEC Permit"'; "The Guide
to Permit Hearings"; and "The Guide to Mediation Services."
141. Id. § (I1)(B)(1). The DEC's website states the "purpose of this hotline is to serve
minority and low-income communities. It is not intended as a hotline for general environmen-
tal information unrelated to issues of Environmental Justice." See Environmental justice Hotline,
Department of Environmental Justice, http://www.dec.ny.gov/public/917.html (last visited Oc-
tober 24, 2014).
142. For a complete list of activities, see Policy 29, supra note 11, § (1II)(B).
143. Including staff in, among others, the Divisions of Air Resources, Solid and Hazard-
ous Materials, Water, Environmental Permits, Public Affairs, and Education. Id. § (B)(9).
144. Id. § (11)(B)(7).
145. Id. § ((13)(11).
146. Id. § (I)(8)(8).
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environmental impact analysis as a component of the EIS for projects
in environmental justice communities.'47
In its final report, the Disproportionate Adverse Environmental
Impact Group recommended that the DEC adopt methods to assess
disproportionate adverse impacts, but was unable to reach a consen-
sus on a specific method.' The Disproportionate Adverse Environ-
mental Impact Group also recommended that environmental and
human health be part of EIS analysis.' 49 In identifying specific criteria
to be included, it again deferred to the DEC. 5 " The second work
group, later named the Health Outcome Data Work Group estab-
lished in conjunction with the New York State Department of
Health, was to identify sources of human-health data and the means
for incorporating the data into the environmental review process."'
The DEC (1) did not adopt either group's recommendations and
continues to use demographic data as the sole criteria for designating
an environmental justice community, (2) does not consider dispro-
portionate environmental impacts in its evaluation of whether to
grant a permit to pollute in these communities, and (3) does not con-
sider existing health disparities in the analysis.' 2 We assess the validi-
ty of the policy's requirements in Section IV when we evaluate New
York's Policy 29 under the lens of symbolic politics; however, it is first
necessary to consider why policymakers sometimes implement tooth-
less policies by conceptualizing the theory of symbolic politics.
147. Id. § (III)(B)(8)(ii).
148. See Final Report of New York State Department of Enviornmental Conservation
Disproportionate Adverse Environmental Impact Analysis Work Group, available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits ej.operations-pdf/daeireport.pdf (last visited October 24,
2014). The DEC has yet to adopt these recommendations.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id.
151. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (B)(8)(ii). The Health Outcome Data Work Group's Re-
port was published three years after Policy 29's effective date. See NYSDEC and NYSDOH,
Report of the Health Outcome Data Work Group, available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/
docs/permits-ej-operations-pdf/hodreport.pdf (last visited October 24, 2014) (recommending a
number of health outcomes to be considered in environmental justice analysis, including respir-
atory diseases, cardiovascular diseases, cancer, perinatal health, and lead (blood levels)). The
Health Outcome Data Work Group also proposed that spatial statistics be incorporated into
environmental review to evaluate for clusters of illnesses in conjunction with the environmental
justice analysis. The DEC has not adopted any of the recommendations.
152. See generally Policy 29, supra note 11.
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III. CONCEPTUALIZING SYMBOLIC POLITICS
Strategies of environmental protection have been unable to halt
the trajectory of environmental destruction. Some argue that this is
the inevitable outcome of half-hearted measures accomplishing too
little, too late.1 53 Programs designed to address environmental prob-
lems are often more symbolic than functional.5 4 This may occur be-
cause the politico wished to take a stance on an environmental issue.
By creating pro-environment policies, the policymaker gets credit for
voting for "health and the environment" and against "trading lives for
dollars."' 5 Often in this case, the policymaker or legislature passes
the hard issues surrounding how to actually implement the policy on
to the regulatory agency or to the courts. 5 6 The lawmakers or poli-
cymakers may or may not have intended for the policy goals to be re-
alized.
Policies sometimes appear more symbolic than functional simply
because the policy fails.'57 To label symbolic politics simply as inef-
fectual politics, however, is misleading. Laws and policies fail to meet
their goals for a host of reasons. Ineffective laws or policies differ
from symbolic politics because the policymakers actually intend for
the goals to be reached. These policymakers plan and hope for the
substantive outcome, yet often the means implemented are simply in-
sufficient for achieving the policy's stated goals. In contrast, authentic
politics genuinely seek to respond to citizens' concerns and attempt
to effectively address the "real issues."' 58 Thus, symbolic politics is the
term reserved for cases where the legislature or policymakers know at
the outset that the measures being implemented would be insufficient
for achieving the policy's goals and that the policy will ultimately
fail.' In this section, we consider some of the reasons symbolic poli-
153. Bluhdorn,supra note 18, at 252.
154. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233
(1990).
155. Id. (arguing that Section 112 of the Clean Air Act is symbolic legislation).
156. Id.
157. Newig, supra note 19, at 277-78.
158. Bliihdorn, supra note 18, at 258.
159. Symbolic politics are characterized by the fact that the gap between codification (or
release of a policy) and implementation is already known and tolerated, if not deliberately in-
tended. Matten, supra note 22, at 216.
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tics emerge and potential methods for distinguishing symbolic poli-
cies from legitimate ones. This background sets the stage for an eval-
uation of New York's environmental justice policy under the lens of
symbolic politics.
A. Why Symbolic Politics Emerge
When first articulated by Murray Edelman, symbolic politics
theory suggested that privileged elites used deceptive practices to
trick common citizens. 160 That is, citizens were fooled into believing
that productive policies had been enacted to increase the general wel-
fare when, in fact, the laws were empty of substance. Symbolic laws
thus can be labeled as lip service, toothless, empty rhetoric, or win-
dow dressing.161 While Edelman's work in 1968 may have been
groundbreaking, the reasoning behind symbolic politics theory is
common sense. We can easily envision circumstances where politi-
cians and the public support toothless policies. Public choice theory
lays the groundwork for the theories of symbolic rhetoric. 162 Individ-
ual politicians make decisions that are most likely to benefit them.
The nature of elections means that politicians promote policies
that will garner votes. Some issues have widespread support and it is
hard to appear to be opposing them, and yet the politicians may not
have the desire or political will to affect actual change. Environmen-
tal laws often fall into this category. No one wants to be seen as anti-
environment, but many are reluctant to make the real changes to be-
havior and the economy that yield sought-after environmental bene-
fits. 163 More recent scholarship notes that in some cases, the rhetoric
stems not just from politicians but also from an electorate that does
not actually want to undertake the measures needed to meet the stat-
ed goal.164 Thus, symbolic politics may stem from deception of the
public by politicians or self-deception of individuals who are conflict-
160. EDELMAN, supra note 23, at 2.
161. Happaerts, supra note 23, at 4.
162. See Newig, supra note 19, (applying public choice theory and self-deception to a case
where the public supported strict traffic restrictions in Germany to reduce smog in summer
months, yet did not obey the temporary speed limits).
163. See generally Matten, supra note 22.
164. See generally Bliihdorn, supra note 18.
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ed about wanting to support the goals of the policy yet worry about
the costs such policies might entail.'65
The latter category has been referred to as simulative politics
where a policy "articulates demands which are not supposed to be taken
seriously and implemented," but rather, are part of a larger "tacit
strategic community" between the public and the politicians. 16 6 As a
form of self-deception, the public acquiesces or supports a policy
claiming to address a societal problem (such as pollution) without ac-
tually implementing the means to address the problem. 167 This mutu-
al tactic between politicians and consumers can be exemplified in the
regulation of greenhouse gases. The general public may appear to
want regulation, yet may not be prepared or have the desire to
change behaviors or alter lifestyles to reduce greenhouse gas concen-
trations. The more the government appears to be doing something to
address the reduction of gases, the less important it becomes to the
general public. 16' Regardless of whether the public acquiesces to a
policy's creation, symbolic politics require that policymakers know
from the outset that policy will be ineffective at reaching its stated
goals.
All politics contain a degree of symbolism, yet the scale is a grad-
uated one. 169 Some laws (including the Clean Water Act and the En-
dangered Species Act) contain aspirational provisions that no policy-
maker, drafting or voting for the law, envisioned coming to pass."7
For example, the Clean Air Act declared a goal of achieving national
ambient air quality standards in every state by 1975.17 This never
happened, yet the Act's implementation is estimated to have prevent-
165. Newig, supra note 19, at 279.
166. Bliihdorn, supra note 18, at 267-68.
167. Newig, supra note 19, at 291-92.
168. Edelman finds that whether or not the legislation is actually implemented may be
less important than the fact that the legislation has been introduced or enacted. See EDELMAN,
supra note 23.
169. Newig, supra note 19, at 278.
170. See, e.g., Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air
Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99 (2006) (arguing that "Congress chose
consciously to include symbolic mandates in the Clean Air Act, a precommitment strategy de-
signed to ensure that the Act would be respected by regulators and regulated entities alike").
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). The Clean Water Act also contained ambitious goals, call-
ing for the elimination of the discharge of all pollutants into navigable waterways by 1985. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
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ed more than 200,000 deaths in just two decades. 7 2 By stating the
larger goal of achieving air quality goals in every state, Congress sig-
naled that it was making pollution control a national responsibility." 3
Meanwhile, other portions of the Act substantively addressed the un-
derlying issue of air quality through the implementation of pollution-
reduction measures.7 4 In contrast, the Pollution Prevention Act of
1990, which created a national policy to "prevent or reduce pollution
at the source whenever feasible,"'75 contained broad aspirational pro-
visions without compliance and action-forcing mechanisms to ensure
pollution was reduced.'76 Furthermore, the legislation did not come
with a large budget, regulatory structure, implementation deadlines, a
designated compliance authority, or stringent emission standards.' 77
Instead, the Act authorized the EPA to take on a number of advisory
responsibilities, including: (1) developing and implementing a strate-
gy that promotes EPA activities that prevent the generation, emis-
sion, or discharge of pollution at their source; (2) establishing an in-
dependent office to coordinate approaches to source reduction; (3)
coordinating with other federal agencies to facilitate source reduc-
tion; (4) developing a standard means to measure source reduction;
and (5) establishing a state grant matching program and a clearing-
172. Ambient concentrations of a number of air pollutants have been significantly reduced
under the Act, including lead by 92%, thereby greatly reducing the number of children with
low IQs resulting from dirty air. Despite significant improvements in air quality, urban prob-
lems of ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter persist; one hundred million Americans
currently live in cities that are out of attainment with ozone standards. The Clean Air Act: High-
lights of the 1990 Amendments, EPA, available at http://www.epa.gov/
air/caa/pdfs/CAA 1990 amendments.pdf (last visited October 24, 2014).
173. Paul Rogers, EPA Histoiy: The Clean Air Act of 1970, EPA J. (1990) available at
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-clean-air-act-1970 (last visited October 24, 2014).
The 1967 Clean Air Act had been perceived as a failure, and there was mounting public pres-
sure for Congress to set national air quality standards as a means to rectify the nation's air pol-
lution crisis. See id.
174. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). Dwyer argues § 112 is symbolic legislation for the
regulation of primary air pollutants due to the complexities surrounding the EPA's mandate
under the Clean Air Act to implement "health-based standards." Dwyer, supra note 154, at 235.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (2012) (defining pollution prevention as "any practice which (i)
... reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant entering any
waste stream or otherwise released into the environment (including fugitive emissions) prior to
recycling, treatment, or disposal).
176. Miles L. Burnett, The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990: A Policy Whose Time Has Come
or Symbolic Legislation? 22 ENVrL. MGMT. 213, 214 (1998).
177. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (2012).
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house on source reduction practices.'78 None of these functions di-
rectly limit or reduce the amount of pollution disposed of or released
into the environment. So, while the Clean Air Act has provisions for
reducing pollution, the Pollution Prevention Act contains nothing
that effectively reduces the amount of pollutants in the environment.
The Pollution Prevention Act is a stronger example for symbolic pol-
itics than the Clean Air Act.
How did the circumstances differ surrounding the passage of the
Clean Air Act and the Pollution Prevention Act? Why, in one in-
stance, would Congress enact a law with teeth and substance and in
another completely sidestep any substantive measures? There are a
number of theories for why this occurs. Symbolic politics, or those
laws and policies with a paucity of substantive measures despite legis-
lative representations to the contrary, are said to occur in conditions
of high political pressure or in instances where there is a good degree
of public attention on the issue.'79 Social problems without an appro-
priate solution at the time or for which the short-term costs exceed
the benefits are also likely to result in symbolic politics.8 In such
cases, sometimes the politico creates policy simply to declare a stance
on an issue where it is not yet prepared to offer the solution.'' In the
case of the Pollution Prevention Act, the politico declared the na-
tion's position on the issue of pollution prevention-that it was pref-
erable, albeit voluntary. Without including an "enforcement stick" or
action-forcing mechanisms, the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee stated that the act was only intended as a first step
in developing a larger pollution-regulatory framework." 2
Symbolic politics are also more likely to occur when the issue at
hand is complex, when significant diverging interests are present, and
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13102-13105 (2012).
179. Newig, supra note 19, at 282.
180. Id.
181. Sometimes these "replacement policies" arise as a matter of choice in attempts to
avoid or postpone uncomfortable implications of a policy measure; or a policy may be a "cun-
ning and sinister strategic instrument used by power elites to deceive the public into believing
that its concerns are being heard and addressed, whilst the elites are secretly pursuing their own
interests which probably conflict with those of the public." Bliihdorn, supra note 18, at 256.
182. US S. 1990. Comm. on Env't. and Public-Works, POLLUTION PREVENTION ACT
of 199,. 101st Cong. 2d Sess., S. Rept. No. 526.
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when there is a misalignment of costs and benefits183 as is the case
when it comes to pollution prevention, industry, and public health. 184
The larger the societal conflict of interest among competing groups
and the more complex and opaque the issue, the more symbolic poli-
tics are likely to emerge. 8 ' This is where public deception is more
likely to occur. When the issue is complex, an asymmetric distribu-
tion of information regarding a proposed solution can result. 6 Typi-
cally, the problem is so complex that less-informed social groups
cannot fully grasp the implications of the proposed solution and re-
main ignorant of the symbolic nature of the proposed solution it-
self."7 The public often responds as if the problem is being ad-
dressed, and pay less attention.'88 In this sense, the substance of the
act becomes less important than the public's perception or reaction to
it.'89 The appearance of taking action occurs without the costs of the
action. Dwyer says that this process is especially problematic regard-
ing environmental laws because environmental groups take the legis-
lator's promise of a risk-free environment at face value and are ex-
pecting the granting of certain "rights" inherent in such promises,
while industry rigorously opposes the policy at every stage out of fear
that it will be strictly enforced. ° The end result is one where prom-
ises are made, yet not kept, and little room exists for a political com-
promise because the issue is presumed to have already been ad-
dressed.191
183. Happaerts, supra note 23, at 4.
184. A few articles have focused on the connection between symbolic politics and envi-
ronmental regulations, especially where industry is concerned. See, e.g., John Dwyer, supra note
154 (discussing the symbolic nature of the Clean Air Act); Dirk Matten, supra note 22 (applying
a symbolic politics analysis to a German waste management act); Miles Burnett, supra note 176
(evaluating the Pollution Prevention Act for its symbolic nature).
185. Newig, supra note 19, at 284.
186. Id. at 298-04.
187. Id. (arguing that the German Summer Smog Act of 1995 was so riddled with excep-
tions to the rule that the overall objective of reducing ozone concentrations could never be
achieved. It was perceived that the government was handling the situation and public attention
on the issue dropped abruptly after the law's passing).
188. Id. at 291.
189. JOSEPH GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 21 (2d. ed. 1986).
190. Dwyer, supra note 154, at 234.
191. Id.
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Sander Happaerts argues that symbolic politics is more frequent
when potential solutions would disrupt existing power structures or
income disparities-basically, where a policy would significantly af-
fect the social-economic status quo.' 92 Symbolic policies are more
likely when more interests or sectors are involved. 93 The greater the
number of types of stakeholders, the harder it is to satisfy all parties
substantively. The more agencies or sectors involved, the harder it
becomes to coordinate productive solutions.
Another hallmark of symbolic politics is that while the policy is
not effective in addressing a substantive issue, it is effective politically.
In other words, the establishment of a policy furthers the political
goals of a specific political actor or actors.' 94 The politician gets cred-
it for addressing an issue that the public is concerned about, yet the
issue may not be addressed substantively.'95 Newig identifies symbol-
ic policies as those with low issue-related substantive effectiveness but
high political-strategic effectiveness.1 96 Traditional economic theory
states that politicians are self-interested agents and that their behav-
ior is heavily influenced by the constraints they face in the pursuit of
self-interest. 97 Policymakers are faced with the task of issuing poli-
cies and regulations that appease the general electorate, that do not
threaten the ability for businesses to conduct their activities, and
(perhaps most notably) that do not result in job loss.' 98 The general
electorate will fall for the symbolic (decoy) policy so long as there is
an asymmetric distribution of information between business and the
general public.199 In environmental politics, for example, the general
192. Happaerts, supra note 23, at 4. In his evaluation of a burden-shifting provision in the
U.S. tax code, Steve Johnson found that Congress resorted to symbolic legislation because true
burden-shifting (that is, actual attainment of the law's stated goal) would have been "calami-
tous" and not pragmatic. Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Sybolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOwA L. REV. 413, 457 (1999).
193. Happaerts, supra note 23, at 4.
194. Bliihdorn, supra note 18, at 257.
195. Id.
196. Newig, supra note 19, at 279-80.
197. ROBERT MCCORMICK & ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, & THE
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1946).
198. Matten, supra note 22 at 220.
199. Id. at 221.
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public is typically unable to "monitor the effective implementation of
environmental laws.
200
Environmental policies are often symbolic, serving at times as lit-
tle more than lip service. They are often toothless, and sometimes
become outright failures. Yet evaluating the symbolic nature of a pol-
icy is not easy. Policies of all types, especially environmental policies,
can be analytically complex. "Political action has several interlocking
layers, ' 201 and there are varying degrees and types of symbolic politics
to consider. Despite this complexity, we have identified common
themes in the approach to analyzing the symbolic nature of policies.
We now consider these themes and their applications and then move
into the analysis of New York's policy.
B. Methods jbr Assessing the Symbolic Nature of Policies
Symbolic politics occur in two forms, either (1) where policymak-
ers deliberately intend for a law or policy to fail or (2) where the poli-
cy is designed merely to initiate a political process towards reaching
broader goals that the government is currently unable or unwilling to
fulfill. 2° 2 This implies that the concept of symbolic politics is one of
ex ante perspective, requiring us to consider what the intent was of
the policymakers at the time the policy was created, including what
they actually knew as well as what they could have known. 203 This can
200. Id.
201. Bluhdorn, supra note 18, at 257.
202. Matten, supra note 22, at 216. Blhidhorn argues that symbolic politics as traditionally
described fails to fully encompass the current state of affairs. He asserts that we have moved
beyond symbolic politics to a stage of "performance of seriousness." Finding that general asser-
tions that symbolic politics are simply a result of the strategic action of political elites are sim-
plistic and unhelpful, he breaks symbolic politics into typologies while declaring the typologies
all to be inadequate statements of our current state of affairs where the electorate silently en-
dorses the ineffectualness of policies. In analytically distinguishing various types of symbolic
politics, Blidhorn begins by categorizing all symbolic politics as "replacement actions" for poli-
cies that would be genuinely effective in achieving their declared purpose. These replacement
actions, which are incapable of achieving the policy's apparent goals, are then subdivided into
either category of (1) best possible action or (2) deliberate strategy. If the policy falls into the
category of "best possible action," then it arose from a political dilemma where there were no
other viable alternatives. If the policy was developed as a "deliberate strategy," then it may have
been a strategic choice where alternative forms of action were consciously avoided. Bludhorn,
supra note 18.
203. Newig, supra note 19, at 279.
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be difficult for obvious reasons, as there is no real way to determine
what goes on in the minds of politicians." Avoiding this obstacle, re-
searchers have developed ways (or signals) to identify whether a poli-
cy is more symbolic than functional.
We can think of symbolic politics as having two components of
efficacy: substantive and political-strategic." 5 Substantive efficacy is
whether the policy is likely to reach its stated goals (does the policy
have the provisions, including funding and enforcement mechanisms,
to achieve what it sets out to do).2°6 Political-strategic efficacy is
whether the policy is likely to help politicians reach other goals (does
the policy increase the likelihood of a favorable rating or re-election
for the policymaker?). °7 Newig offers elements for measuring each
type of efficacy.
To assess substantive efficacy, we look to the policy's substantive
suitability, enforceability, and recognition of the framework parame-
ters. Substantive suitability examines the extent to which the substan-
tive elements of the policy are suited to attain the policy's goals."'
This requires an inquiry into whether the law or policy (if actually
carried out as specified) would yield the stated goals.209 Where the
policy elements don't even meet the policy objectives on paper, the
substantive or issue-related effectiveness will necessarily be low.210
Assessing enforceability involves considering the legal provisions of
the law or policy and whether they provide the implementing author-
ity with the ability to control compliance or sanction non-
204. Conducting interviews of those involved at the time the policy or law is created may
be of some use, provided that the responses given are accurate. One researcher interviewed the
congressional staff that worked for the Democratic and Republican members active in the de-
velopment of certain legislation, primarily to determine whom the audience or interest group
was of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Barbara Ann Stolz, Interpreting the U.S.
Human Trafficking Debate Through the Lens of Symbolic Politics, 29 L. & POL. 311, 316-17 (2007),
(evaluating the symbolic function of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act).
205. Newig, supra note 19, at 281.
206. Id. at 279.
207. Id. at 280-81.
208. Id. at 280.
209. Id.
210. Happaerts also characterizes symbolic politics where policies have a low-impact ef-
fectiveness and as deliberately failing to meet policy objectives, essentially not solving any of the
problems in the 'real' world. See Happaerts supra note 23, at 4-5.
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compliance.1 1 Where policies fail to provide agencies with tools to
enforce the law, again substantive effectiveness will be low. 212 Even
where there is high suitability, an inability to enforce makes a law
toothless.213 Finally, recognition of framework parameters involves
looking at a broader array of factors to examine the context of the
policy's implementation.214 Do we have the adequate resources and
structures to implement the policy? Do appropriate agencies exist? Is
there missing infrastructure? A lack of material elements for imple-
mentation inevitably equals low substantive effectiveness.
The criteria for assessing prospective political-strategic effective-
ness are a little harder to categorize, but Newig suggests three objec-
tive criteria likely to demonstrate high political-strategic effective-
ness, including the severity of legal consequences in cases of non-
compliance, position in the hierarchy of law, and timing. First, high
severity of legal consequences in the case of non-compliance signals a
strong resolve on an issue.2 15 When a policy has severe consequences
for infractions, it conveys the message that the policymakers view the
211issue as a serious one. Where these severe penalties (large fines,
long sentences) are accompanied by an inability to enforce the law,
we might expect high political-strategic efficiency even though sub-
stantive efficiency is low. 217 Second, the position that the law or poli-
211. Newig, supra note 19, at 281.
212. Often the means or tools implemented are mrelated to the specific goals of the poli-
cy or are primarily economic in nature. Happaerts, supra note 23, at 8-9. In order not to inter-
fere with existing administrative and political action, the instruments designed for the policy
often do not have teeth. Id. at 4.
213. Newig, supra note 19, at 284-86 (Even though a German smog act targeting ozone
had implemented a related ban on non-low-emission vehicles, Newig found it to be symbolic
when the politicians interviewed admitted to their awareness that traffic restrictions were mas-
sively violated and not enforced).
214. Id. at 281.
215. Id. at 286-88 (finding a German Ordinance on Large Combustion Plants to be a
highly effective and substantive environmental law on the basis of stringent threshold values for
air pollutants for power stations, monitoring by authorities, and serious fines for violators).
216. Id. at 289. In the case of the German Smog Act, members of parliament and gov-
ernmental officials admitted they did not actually want the ordinance to be enforced, which
would have required massive traffic bans lasting for several weeks each summer. In contrast, the
combustion plant ordinance was easier to enforce, at the source of the pollution (the power
plant).
217. Id. at 286. Newig found the substantive suitability of the smog act to ultimately be
low on the basis of numerous exceptions to the ban on non-low-emission vehicles, yet the act
maintained high political-strategic efficiency as measured by the subsequent decline of atten-
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cy occupies in the hierarchy of law may play a role. When a policy is
embodied in a constitutional amendment or legislation, it may seem
more powerful or important than something coming in the form of
an administrative regulation or local ordinance.218 Policy announce-
ments in statutes or executive orders likely receive a higher profile in
the media and appear more important than policies articulated in
agency-guidance documents.219 Third, looking at the timing of a pol-
icy announcement or bill passage provides some guidance on politi-
cal-strategic effectiveness.220 Passing laws shortly before an election
for example may result in higher political-strategic effectiveness as
policymakers seek to visibly take credit for new policies.221
Beyond examining the objective criteria, understanding subjective
criteria embodied by legislative intent is important.222 Such infor-
mation may be hard to obtain however, without extensive confiden-
tial interviews with key policymakers 23 Potentially, political effec-
tiveness could be measured by election returns and polling data. Yet,
it can be hard to tease out the effect of one policy or law on a candi-
date's popularity. Moreover, there may be political-strategic gains
that are less visible.224 According to Happaerts, symbolic policies of-
ten begin with an initial burst of political will for the institutionaliza-
tion of the concept, followed by a universal lack of political will to
sincerely commit to the policy goals.225 These measures of political-
strategic effectiveness serve as examples but are not an exhaustive list
of factors. Indeed, there is a squishiness to trying to assess political-
strategic effectiveness. Even though it is challenging, reviewing a pol-
tion by the general public on the issue after legislation was enacted. See also Happaerts, supra
note 23, at 4 (finding sustainability policies to have high political effectiveness on the basis of
succeeding in displaying to the public a broad commitment by public officials on the issue of
sustainability, despite a low impact effectiveness).
218. Newig, supra note 19, at 281.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Happaerts, supra note 23, at4.
222. Newig, supra note 19, at 281.
223. Id.
224. Bldihdorn considers a situation where issues of political effectiveness include generat-
ing and stabilizing power. He theorizes that, in some instances, the political elites are actually
"victims of unfavorable conditions which are beyond their control" thereby creating replace-
ment policies for more authentic ones. Bldihdorn, supra note 18, at 256-57.
225. Happaerts supra note 23, at 11.
219
183] Symbolic Politics for Disempowered Communities
icy for substantive effectiveness is more straightforward than trying
to assess the strategic-political benefits a policy might yield.
Happaerts adds to the analysis by looking at the policy goals and
the specific policy instruments put into place to achieve these goals.226
Distinguishing between strategic and operational goals, he says that
strategic goals are those that are "abstract and express a government's
vision of the future." '227 These policies essentially build upon a model
that is meant to stimulate a core issue and hope that the government
and non-government actors will "have the goodwill to follow the
noncommittal guidelines"22 ' (like the Pollution Prevention Act, per-
haps). Often in this case, the efforts are not concerned with the sub-
stance of the policy at all (as in Newig's substantive suitability analy-
sis) and often include activities such as public participation,
translating documents, and administrative support units, such as in-
terdepartmental committees or working groups.229 There may be a
"master document" in the form of a "strategy, plan, or something
else," developed to represent the government's efforts to institution-
alize the policy goals.230 Besides these instrumental efforts, Happaerts
finds there is often a reliance on economic instruments, the most
common in the form of project funding or subsidies.23 ' A final type of
policy instrument includes "information instruments" used to "incite
other actors to join the government in their pursuit." '232 This may
come down in the form of public information documents or guides to
those individuals encouraged to follow the policy.233 Happaerts says
the "toothless character" of these is further underscored by numerous
problems regarding their enforcement with no stringent evaluation
instruments implemented.3
Assessing the degree to which a policy meets its stated goals can
be accomplished using Newig's analysis of substantive efficacy by
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looking to its substantive suitability, enforceability, and framework
parameters as described above. Whether the policy fits into the cate-
gory of best possible action or deliberate strategy can be assessed in
part by Newig's analysis of political-strategic efficacy. If the action is
deliberately undertaken to deceive the public and pursue a secret
agenda, it is more likely that the policy will result in high-political ef-
ficacy. If the political effectiveness is low, one can look to other evi-
dence to ascertain whether other options existed at the time the poli-
cy was created. In the next section, we apply Newig's approach for
evaluating the symbolic nature of New York's policy on environmen-
tal justice.
IV. NEW YORK'S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY: SYMBOLIC
OR AUTHENTIC?
With the backdrop of symbolic politics and a general understand-
ing of environmental justice policies, this section examines whether
New York's environmental justice policy is something authentic with
meaning and substance or just another example of symbolic poli-
tics.23 Evaluation of the substantive and political efficacy of the dec-
ade-old policy provides insight as to the functional versus symbolic
nature of the policy. We begin by providing the general construct
and timing of New York's policy and then move to its evaluation. We
conclude by considering whether the policy in its primarily symbolic
form has any functional value in a symbolic state.
A. The Timing of Policy 29
Following the 1987 seminal United Church of Christ study on
toxic waste and race, the early 1990s were abuzz with talk of envi-
ronmental justice, including numerous scholarly symposia,236 the
235. See Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the
New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 457 (1999) (assessing a section of the tax code
to determine whether it has any substantive meaning and concluding that it does not).
236. See e.g., Symposium, EnvironmentalJustice: The Merging of Civil Rights & Environnen-
tal Activism, 9 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT 1 (1993-1994); Symposium, Third Annual Stein
Center Symposium on Conternporay Urban Challenges, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 425 (1994); Sym-
posium, Environmental Justice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994); Symposium, Earth
Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Enviromnental Protection, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 213
(1993); Symposidtm, Race, Class, and EnvironmentalRegulation, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992).
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Fignrc 1: Community residents rally in 1997 to demand that the Manhattanville Bus Depot in-
vest in alternative fuels to protect Harlem schoolchildren from elevated exposure to diesel/fames. 117
EPA's 1992 creation of its Office of Environmental Justice, President
Clinton's 1994 Executive Order, and the emergence of environmen-
tal advocacy groups.23 8 States were beginning to respond by enacting
their own environmental justice legislation and related policies.239 In
1998, community representatives met with New York State officials
to discuss their concerns surrounding environmental justice 24 and
WE ACT, a non-profit environmental justice organization "negotiat-
ed with Governor Pataki and the DEC to create an Environmental
Justice Advisory Committee. ' 24 1 In 1999, Governor Pataki and DEC
Commissioner John Cahill announced the creation of a New York
State program to address environmental justice concerns, which in-
cluded the formation of an Environmental Justice Advisory Group to
provide recommendations on how to incorporate community partici-
pation and environmental justice concerns into the state's permitting
process. In the DEC press release announcing the new program,
Commissioner Cahill stated:
237. WE ACT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 17"h ANNIVERSARY REPORT 9 (photo)
(2005).
238. See supra note 33.
239. See supra § 1I.B.
240. Policy 29, supra note 11, § II.
241. WE ACT, 171h ANNIVERSARY REPORT, supra note 236, at 18.
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Governor Pataki recognizes the importance of environmental jus-
tice and the need for community involvement in permitting deci-
sions that can potentially impact the environment and public
health .... This program will ensure that local communities are
given an opportunity to express their concerns and that those con-
cerns are considered when making permitting decisions.
242
Cahill also "said that addressing environmental justice and facility
compliance issues early on in the permitting process is the most ef-
fective strategy for preventing or reducing disproportionately adverse
environmental effects on low-income and minority communities. "243
The response to the announcement by environmental groups was
strongly positive. The board president of the New York capital re-
gion's Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corporation, stated, "The
Governor's commitment to environmental justice is second to none.
George Pataki has a real appreciation that all New Yorkers must be
treated fairly and meaningfully involved in development decisions
and the implementation of environmental laws. ' '2' The chairman of
the New York League of Conservation Voters (an influential political
group who had recently endorsed the Governor) said:
I think it is very smart for Governor Pataki to move aggressively on
the environmental justice issue. I know both the Governor and
Commissioner Cahill consider the issue very important, as does the
entire environmental community. Setting up a program that will
fully evaluate the environmental justice impact of projects, early in
the permitting process, is a good first step in the effort to integrate
these considerations into all government decision making.24 5 The
program would eventually "formalize existing practices within the
state's permitting process and develop new policies and strategic in-
itiatives.., in ensuring fair treatment of all individuals.. ."'46 This
formalization came down in 2003 in the DEC's policy on environ-
mental justice, Counissioner Policy 29,Environmental Justice and
242. NYS DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
243. Id.
244. Aaron Mair, Board Member of the NY League of Conservation Voters and Board
President of the Arbor Hill Environmental Justice Corporation (in a 2002 press release an-
nouncing the League's early endorsement for George Pataki for Governor), available at
http://nylcv.com/Politics/2002/pataki.html.
245. NYS DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
246. Id.
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Permitting (Policy 29). To assess whether Policy 29 is authentic poli-
tics and a genuine effort by the DEC and the governor's office to
improve environmental justice outcomes or just another example of
symbolic politics, we look at the substantive efficacy of the policy.24 7
B. Policy 29's Substantive Efficacy
The first step in assessing whether a policy is symbolic involves
examining whether the substance of the policy could actually produce
its desired outcome.24 8 Symbolic politics is the most obvious where a
policy's goals are not achievable even on paper.249 Additionally, a
hallmark of symbolic politics is that those involved in crafting and
supporting the strategy understood at its implementation or passage
that it would not be effective.250 Using Newig's elements as the basis
of our analysis, we evaluate the substantive efficacy of the policy by
looking to its substantive suitability (the extent to which the substan-
tive requirements of the policy are actually related to the policy's
goals), its enforceability, and the policy's framework (does the policy
create an advisory structure or something more concrete like an en-
forcement agency?). In other words, we are asking whether the policy
contains the proper tools for achieving its goals.
Looking to the substantive suitability of the policy, it is helpful to
first identify the goals of the policy and the mechanisms or tools in-
volved in its implementation. We can then evaluate whether the tools
implemented are (or have been) capable of meeting the policy goals.
Policy 29 states: "This policy is specifically intended to ensure that the
DEC's environmental permit process promotes environmental jus-
tice... This policy also encourages DEC efforts to implement other
programs, policies, regulations, legislative proposals and activities re-
lated to environmental justice. ' Based on these policy statements,
the policy, in effect, should do two things: (1) ensure that the state's
permitting process promotes environmental justice and (2) result in
supplemental environmental justice activities within the state. The
247. See infra § (IV)(B).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See infra § (IV)(B).
251. Policy 29, supra note 11,ll§(I).
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policy outlines fifteen directives for achieving these goals." 2 These
directives can be categorized into four types of activities: those that
target permit applicants regarding the required procedures surround-
ing the state's policy on environmental justice, those that target the
environmental justice community to enhance communication and
public participation, those that enhance the state's permitting review
process to incorporate environmental justice, and those that require
future policy developments.253
Are these directives capable of reaching the policy's first-stated
goal of ensuring that the state's permitting process promotes environ-
mental justice? As outlined in Section II, the modifications to the
state's permitting process under the policy include the requirement
that permit applicants submit a public-participation plan for certain
activities proposed in environmental justice communities as well as
modifications to the DEC's application of the SEQRA process.254
The public-participation plans require the applicant to identify all
stakeholders to the proposed action, to post project-related infor-
mation in plain language (and translated when necessary) within the
community, and to hold public informational meetings to keep the
public informed throughout the process.25 As the SEQRA process
allows agencies to require the use of a longer Environmental Assess-
ment Form in lieu of a shorter form for actions the agency deems ap-
propriate, Policy 29 formalizes this option by requiring project appli-
cants to complete the longer form for all unlisted actions proposed in
identified environmental justice communities.256 Policy 29 also re-
quires that permit applicants outline how the environmental justice
community will be affected and hold public hearings on the proposed
activity where it is determined a significant adverse environmental
impact will occur and an EIS is required.257
In assessing whether these directives are capable of achieving the
policy's goal of promoting environmental justice, it is helpful to re-
consider the policy's definition of environmental justice: "the fair
252. Id. § (Il1)(B)(1-15).
253. id.





treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, or income with respect to the development, implementa-
tion, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and poli-
cies. ' '258 Fair treatment is further defined to mean "no group of peo-
ple, including a racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences
resulting from industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or
the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and poli-
cies.'') It would be difficult to argue that the policy's directives on
paper do not promote these concepts. After all, one can construe
"promote" to mean to simply encourage, support, or advertise. The
policy never actually states that its goal is to address or rectify in-
stances of environmental injustices. With that, it is fair to conclude
that the policy's directives are capable of producing the policy's goals,
thereby demonstrating high substantive suitability.
However, if we look beyond the goals actually stated in the policy
to what the policymakers were promoting around the time the policy
was being developed, the public's perception of what the policy
would actually achieve may have been different from what was stated
in the policy. In 1999, when DEC Commissioner Cahill announced
the new state program, he noted that "addressing environmental jus-
tice and facility compliance issues early on in the permitting process
is the most effective strategy for preventing or reducing dispropor-
tionately adverse environmental effects on low income and minority
communities. ' '"0 Based on this statement, the general public likely
expected that addressing environmental justice issues and facility
compliance would be a priority under the state's then-forthcoming
environmental justice policy. Yet, in regards to facility compliance,
the policy states only that supplemental enforcement and compliance
inspections will occur where there is reason to believe a facility is in
non-compliance.26 ' There are no mandatory compliance inspections
of facilities in environmental justice communities nor are there re-
quirements for permit applicants to mention facilities out of compli-
258. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (I1)(A)(2).
259. Id.
260. NYS DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
261. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (I)(B)(10).
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ance in the vicinity of their proposed project. And, environmental
justice is only promoted under the policy.
The second policy goal was to encourage the DEC's efforts to im-
plement other programs, policies, regulations, legislative proposals,
and activities related to environmental justice. The directives out-
lined in the policy included developing a formal training on envi-
ronmental justice to affected staff in a number of the DEC's divi-
sions, drafting legislation to establish funding and criteria for a
technical assistance grant program for assisting the public in the
permit review process, and promulgating regulations to address dis-
proportionate adverse environmental impacts on environmental jus-
tice communities.262 Here again, it would be difficult to argue that on
paper the policy directives are not capable of achieving the desired or
stated goals. If the policy's goal is merely to encourage the develop-
ment of other programs, regulations, and legislative proposals, it cer-
tainly achieves this goal through the stated directives to begin agency
training programs and the drafting of legislation and regulations. The
problem is that many members of the general public, are apt to be-
lieve that an order to develop draft regulations to address dispropor-
tionate adverse environmental impacts will actually result in the regu-
lation being produced, thereby actually addressing the problem at
hand.
Newig's second element in determining the substantive suitability
of a policy tells us to look to the policy's enforceability.263 Policy 29
sets forth 15 directives.2" The policy contains two measures directly
related to ensuring that the state's permitting program promotes en-
vironmental justice, including the requirements for enhanced public
participation plans and completion of lengthier environmental as-
sessment forms. 65 The enhanced public participation plans are to be
completed by the project applicant and submitted to the DEC as part
of the permitting process.266 However, there is no enforcement
262. Id. § (II)(B)(9), (12), (13).
263. See mpra § (I).
264. See supra note 252.
265. See supra § (11)(C)(1).
266. Id.
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mechanism to ensure the project applicant executes the participation
plan.2
67
The DEC is also responsible for processing and either approving
or denying the permit applications and thus oversees preparation of
the environmental assessment forms. With regard to those directives
encouraging DEC efforts to implement other environmental justice
programs, policies, and the like, there does not appear to be any "en-
forcement stick" if the DEC does not follow through. In fact, the
policy uses a lot of soft language such as:
This policy shall be reviewed at least 18 months from the effective
date and be revised, as necessary, to consider the policy's applicability
to various DEC Programs, incorporate evolving information on en-
vironmental justice[,] ... reflect the best available environmental in-
formation and resources[,] ... [and] DEC shall periodically evaluate
the need for further revision . . . as implementation experience is
gained.268
More than a decade has passed since the policy's effective date,
yet the policy has never been revised, has never been applied to other
DEC programs, and has not been amended to incorporate new in-
formation or resources. However, the policy does not explicitly state
that these things must be achieved. The policy is only to be revised as
necessary; the DEC should only consider whether the policy is applica-
ble to other agency programs; and new information and resources are
only to be added when experience is gained.
Where explicit, concrete directives exist, such as the one to "es-
tablish two work groups to assist DEC to develop and incorporate
critical environmental justice information into the DEC environmen-
tal review process," '269 the DEC has followed through.17 ' The prob-
lem is that the policy directives continue with vague requirements
stating, "results will be considered by the DEC Commissioner when
revising this policy. ' 271' The DEC may have considered the work
groups' recommendations, but they were sparsely integrated into the
267. Id.
268. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (III) (emphasis added).
269. Id. § (ffI)(B)(8)(1).
270. See supra § (ll)(C)(1).
271. Policy 29, supra note 11, § (II1)(B)(8).
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final policy 72 and the policy has never been amended. Even if the
DEC failed to enforce the policy's directives, the policy explicitly
states that it "does not create any right or benefit, substantial or pro-
cedural, enforceable by law or equity by a party against the DEC or
any right to judicial review." ' Thus, on the enforceability question,
Policy 29 fares poorly-indicating low substantive efficacy and high
likelihood of symbolic politics.
The third and final element of Newig's assessment of substantive
efficacy directs us to look at the framework of the policy.174 To do so,
we examine an array of factors relating to the context of the policy's
implementation. Are there adequate resources and structures to im-
plement the policy? Do appropriate agencies exist? Is there missing
infrastructure? Although on paper the DEC appears to have put into
place the mechanisms necessary for achieving the policy's loosely
stated goals, Happaerts adds to the analysis by examining the nature
of the policy's goals (either strategic or operational).275 In doing so,
we can assess whether the policy is merely strategic in presenting a
government's vision of the future or is enforcing operational proce-
dures toward a concrete goal.2 76 If the policy's goals appear to be
strategy-oriented rather than operational, the likelihood of symbolic
politics is increased.277
In the case of Policy 29, the goals of promoting environmental jus-
tice and encouraging the development of related activities most cer-
tainly fall into the category of strategic over operational. There are
no operational goals such as reducing the number of hazardous facili-
ties by "x" amount in an environmental justice community with "y"
number of facilities. As is often in these types of strategic policies, the
DEC is promoting the concept of environmental justice (like sustain-
ability or pollution prevention) hoping the governmental and non-
governmental actors "will have the goodwill to follow these non-
committal guidelines." '278 Similarly, as Happaerts suggests is the norm
272. See supra § (1I)(C)(1).
273. Policy 29, supra note 11.
274. See supra Section II.
275. Id.





with strategically symbolic policies, the efforts are not concerned
with the substance of the policy at all 27 9 (such as reducing disparate
concentrations of environmentally hazardous facilities). Instead, they
include activities such as public participation, translating documents,
and developing administrative support units such as interdepart-
mental committees or working groups. Besides these instrumental ef-
forts, symbolic policies often include a reliance on economic instru-
ments, the most common being in the form of project funding or
subsidies, 280 as is the case in the DEC's environmental justice pro-
gram today.281 The DEC's Environmental Justice Community Im-
pact Grant Program (apart from the policy) provides grants from
$2,500 to $50,000 to community-based organizations for research
and education projects that address environmental justice. 2 2 These
community grants, although undoubtedly important to improving
conditions in environmental justice communities, do little to address
the disparate concentrations of pollution allocated under the state's
permitting program.
In determining how Policy 29 ranks in overall substantive efficacy,
the analyses of substantive suitability, enforceability, and overall poli-
cy framework bring about mixed results. Policy 29 appears to rank
high for substantive suitability because the policy's directives are suit-
ed to the goals of policy, but only because the goals are to promote en-
vironmental justice in the state's permitting process and to encourage
additional activities (draft regulation and legislation, programs, etc.)
related to environmental justice. The policy goals do not explicitly
address environmental justice issues or disproportionate distributions
of environmental hazards amongst minority and low-income com-
munities, despite what the DEC Commissioner promoted during the
policy's development. Similarly, the policy would rank high for its
enforceability, but only because the only things to enforce are the
promotion of environmental justice in the agency's permitting pro-
gram and the encouragement of developing related programs and ac-
279. See id.
280. Id. at 8-9.
281. In 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo committed an additional $1 million for the grant
program. See NY DEC Environmental Justice Community Impact Grant Program,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/public/31226.html (last visited October 24, 2014).
282. Id.
230
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tivities.
In terms of assessing the policy's overall framework under
Newig's analysis, there is no lacking infrastructure or instruments to
achieve the policy's stated goals as the DEC implemented an Envi-
ronmental Justice Coordinator and an Office of Environmental Jus-
tice to aid in the implementation of the policy's directives. Under
Happaert's analysis, however, we find that the overall policy frame-
work is strategic over operational and is primarily comprised of ad-
ministrative elements. It would appear that the strategic nature of the
policy would necessarily outweigh whether the policy directives were
related to the policy's goals and if these directives were accompanied
by an enforcement stick. It does not matter if the directives are suita-
ble and enforceable if the goals are not what the public perceives
them to be. Policy 29's stated goals are vague-to promote and to en-
courage-whereby the public's perception of the policy's goals is most
likely not so squishy. If the government develops a policy on envi-
ronmental justice, the general public should expect a policy that actu-
ally addresses issues of environmental justice, and rightly so, especial-
ly when the policymaker is touting one that will.
C. Policy 29's Political-Strategic Efficacy
Symbolic policies often begin with an initial burst of political will
for the institutionalization of the concept at issue, followed by a lack
of political will to sincerely commit to the policy goals. 3 Without
backing or widespread political support, there is no political capital
invested to build a powerful policy.24 The result is a lack of capacity
(no personnel, budget, or time) to see the policy through. It is when
this low capacity occurs that the "intentional aspect of symbolic poli-
tics becomes visible. ' 285 This assessment describes the political story
of Policy 29. New York's stance on environmental justice was being
promoted before the policy was ever released. The initial burst of po-
litical will for institutionalizing environmental justice came in 1999 in
response to increased pressure from state environmental justice
283. Happaerts,supra note 23, at 11.
284. Id. at 12.
285. Id.
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groups. It was then that Governor George Pataki and DEC Commis-
sioner John Cahill began touting the state's new environmental jus-
tice program, four years before the policy was ever released. With the
program just getting off the ground Cahill said, "In naming an envi-
ronmental justice coordinator, DEC is moving ahead with our goal of
developing and implementing a state program to ensure that the pub-
lic's rights are not overlooked in the permitting process" and stated
that "addressing environmental justice and facility compliance is-
sues.., is the most effective strategy for preventing or reducing ad-
verse environmental effects on low income and minority communi-
ties. '286 The state's environmental groups rallied around the new
program, including representatives from the highly visible New York
City group, WEACT for Environmental Justice, and the New York
League of Conservation Voters.287 Yet, when it came time to sincere-
ly commit to these goals, political will seemed to flounder and the
policy that was released was watered down, promising only the pro-
motion and encouragement of environmental justice principles in the
state's environmental process.
The final policy ignored some of the pressing recommendations
of the Environmental Justice Advisory Group developed by Gover-
nor Pataki and Commissioner Cahill, including the recommendation
to define environmental justice communities geographically by evalu-
ating the distribution of toxic releases and demographic data.288 The
State Assembly's response to the release of Policy 29 serves as another
indicator that expectations for the policy had been greater. For ten
years prior to the release of the state's policy, the State Assembly
passed similar legislation on environmental justice (only to have it die
in the Senate).289 The year after the DEC policy was released, the As-
sembly expanded its environmental justice legislation to include a bill
requiring the DEC to publish a list of areas most adversely impacted
by existing environmental hazards,29 to legislatively establish a state
environmental justice policy and environmental justice advisory
286. NYS DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
287. Id.
288. See ENVT'LJUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS, sipra note 86, at 9-
11.
289. Seesupra§(I).
290. A. 7862, 227Sess. (N.Y. 2004).
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group,29' and to require the state's permitting process to consider
whether environmental actions would disproportionately affect mi-
nority or low-income populations.292 Each of these bills, too, died in
the Senate.2 93 More recently, the Assembly has used the DEC's inac-
tion in relation to its 2003 environmental justice policy as the basis for
its annual passage of environmental justice legislation.294
So while the DEC (and the governor) may have intended to take
the issue of environmental justice off the table by creating an agency
policy, that at least one political group in power (the Assembly) was
not convinced that it was a meaningful policy. After all, the Assembly
continued to push to pass legislation on the topic. Despite this push,
the Assembly majority passed the executive budget without any fund-
ing to advance the environmental justice policy,295 raising questions as
to the legitimacy of its attempts to push forward the state's policy. Af-
ter all, it has been made quite clear that the Senate will continue to
abstain from passing any of the Assembly's proposed legislation on
the topic. By proposing environmental justice legislation, the Assem-
bly comes across as in favor of effectuating real change, yet when the
governor's executive budget proposed funding for the policy's pro-
jects, the Assembly fails to pass it in the final budget.
Although the then DEC Commissioner criticized the Assembly
for its lack of financial support,2 96 the governor's proposed 2003-
2004 budget did not provide for funding specifically for grants to en-
hance the participation of environmental justice communities in the
permitting process.297 Instead, the governor proposed a meager
$500,000 for "urban environmental initiatives" identified in Policy
29,298 which was adopted in the final enacted budget.299 Ultimately,
291. A. 8805, 227thSess. (N.Y. 2004).
292. A. 5938, 227thSess. (N.Y. 2004).
293. See supra § ().
294. A. 2003, 227ThSess. (N.Y. 2004).
295. Erin M. Crotty, Environmental Justice Initiative Needs Funding, ALBANY TIMES
UNION, June 2, 2003, at A6.
296. Id.
297. Governor George E. Pataki, 2003-2004 New York State Executive Budget, 91 NEW
YORK STATE DrviSION OF THE BUDGET, http://www.budget.ny.gov/
pubs/archive/fy0304archive/fy0304littlebook/Overview0304.pdf. (Last visited October 24,
2014) [hereinafter "Executive Budget"].
298. State of New York, Act, Januayy 29, 2003, 53-54. http://www.budget.ny.gov/
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the $500,000 paled in comparison to what was allocated to other en-
vironmental programs, including $15 million for the development of
the Hudson River Park; $10 million for State Parks Infrastructure
projects; $5 million for the Hudson River Estuary Management Plan;
$5 million for municipal parks and historic preservation projects; $5
million for waterfront revitalization projects; and $750,000 to restore
and preserve historic barns.300 The specific "initiatives" for which the
$500,000 was to be spent on is not exactly clear, although the DEC
offers a number of community grants related to environmental jus-
tice.301
In evaluating the symbolic nature of Policy 29, it may be beneficial
to imagine what an operational policy might actually look like, one
where the policymaker actually intended for a substantive outcome. A
sound environmental justice policy and associated methodological
practices might have looked something like the following: the DEC
identifies environmental justice communities through the evaluation
of socioeconomic and demographic factors in addition to an evaluation
of the distribution of toxic releases and disparate concentrations.30 2
pubs/archive/fy0304archive/fy0304appropbills/ted.pdf (last visited October 24, 2014). Note,
there are no "urban environmental initiatives" explicitly outlined in Policy 29.
299. Executive Budget, supra note 297.
300. Id. at 90-91. Based on this non-exhaustive list, Pataki ranked (or at least priced) pre-
serving barns higher than supporting the participation of minority and low-income communi-
ties in the state's environmental permitting process. Yet, the governor was not touting the
preservation of these barns from his political podium as he was the state's forthcoming policy
on environmental justice.
301. For a list of previous grants funded, see Department of Environmental Conservation,
Winners of Past Environmental Justice Community Impact Grants,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/public/31403.html (last visited October 24, 2014).
302. A subsequent gubernatorial administration did initiate what appeared to be substan-
tive action along these lines. In 2008, interim Governor David Patterson convened an Envi-
ronmental Justice Interagency Task Force. The Task Force met with one hundred stakeholders
(community groups, businesses, and environmental groups) to collect recommendations on is-
sues of air, water, land, food, and toxics. Within these recommendations were calls to the DEC
for the creation of a state environmental justice map and database, as well as for the prioritiza-
tion of enforcement actions and pollution reduction programs in environmental justice com-
munities. In response, the Task Force called for the establishment of an interagency environ-
mental justice Mapping Work Group, to be chaired by the DEC. The Map Group was directed
to develop new criteria for defining environmental justice areas and to create maps representing
Environmental Justice areas using these criteria. All relevant data and tables, including infor-
mation related to polluting facilities, was to be amassed in an Environmental Justice GIS Data-
base to facilitate access to other State agencies and the public. The data and methods would be
used to identify "communities of concern" or "communities of disproportionate impact." See
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The DEC also establishes an Office of Environmental Justice to
oversee facility compliance in these communities, the permitting pro-
cess for proposed activities within these communities, and to respond
to community concerns specific to these areas.
Instead of this hypothetically sound policy, the governor advocat-
ed for and the DEC adopted a very different policy. They established
an environmental advisory group and two working groups to devise
proposed means for identifying the environmental justice community
and addressing environmental justice within the state, yet never
adopted an overwhelming majority of their recommendations, in-
cluding the most pressing one of identifying communities of concern
based on disparate impacts and health effects. Instead of producing
an office to oversee substantive issues such as facility compliance,
permitting activities, and community outreach in environmental jus-
tice communities, the DEC developed the Office of Environmental
Justice that answers an environmental-justice hotline, trains agency
staff on environmental-justice issues, translates documents into Span-
ish, and oversees grant funding. Although these activities may be of
value, they will not directly address disproportionately adverse effects
on low-income and minority communities.
In terms of the subjective issues surrounding the political efficacy
of Policy 29, we cannot say for certain that the policy's promotion and
development positively influenced the governor's career. It may be
helpful to gain some sense of the legitimacy of the governor's pro-
health and environment trademark by considering the circumstances
surrounding his tenure and the environmental policies he supported.
Doing so brings about mixed reviews. Pataki's "legacy" is centered on
his environmental advocacy and the development of policies to pro-
tect the environment.0 3 He is perhaps most notably credited with the
generally NYS Environmental Justice Interagency Task Force Draft Recommendations June 10, 2009,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits-ej-operations-pdf/drftplnejintertskfrce.pdf (last visited
October 24, 2014). These initiatives appear to have been stifled with a change in gubernatorial
leadership and and accompanying lack of support for environmental justice initiatives.
303. See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Green Pataki Taking a Cue from Giuliani, NEW YORK SUN,
August 15, 2007, available at http://www.nysun.com/new-york/green-pataki-taking-a-cue-from-
giuliani/60515/ (on the issue of Governor Pataki and former DEC Commissioner Cahill start-
ing their own environmental consulting business); The Audubon Society of New York, Audubon
Honors George Pataki & Peter Berle, November 5, 2008, available at
http://www.audubon.org/newsroom/press-releases/2008/audubon-honors-george-pataki- peter-
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preservation of 900,000 acres of open space, primarily in the Adiron-
dack region.3 ' During his tenure, Pataki also invested more than
$13.4 billion in environmental protection, including funding the
state's brownfield program, the state's Clean Water/Clean Air Bond
Act, expanding the state's park system, and adopting policies to en-
courage pollution reduction measures and green infrastructure by in-
dustry. 305
Pataki may, however, not be as green as he is sometimes por-
trayed to be. The governor's confident rhetoric about protecting the
environment did not always match the results. He has been criticized
for weakening the enforcement capabilities of the DEC through a re-
duction in staff and enriching businesses through his brownfield leg-
islation.30 6 He is said to have "failed to deliver on [environmental]
promises" in his efforts to "create a friendly environment for busi-
ness." 3°7 In 2004, Pataki was criticized for caving to "immense pres-
sure from the chemical industry, specifically the American Plastics
Council, ' 308 when he vetoed a bill that would have restricted the use
of PVC pipe in the state, which is believed to have dangerous effects
on human health and the environment. 3°9 And in 2003, Pataki was
criticized for reopening an East Harlem bus station in a low-income
and minority community already home to similar facilities, while
berle (honoring Pataki for his many "cutting edge policies in conservation" during his tenure as
governor); Michael Cooper, The Shadow of His Predecessor Dominates the Pataki Legacy, NEW
YORK TIMES, July 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/nyregioni/
29pataki.html?_r=0 (stating, "If there is one area where Mr. Pataki will leave a lasting im-
print,... it is as a conservationist.").
304. Cooper, supra note 303.
305. See Governor George E. Pataki, 2005-06 New York State Executive Budget,
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy056archive/fy56littlebook/lb506.pdf (Last vis-
ited October 24, 2014).
306. Gershman, supra note 303.
307. Anthony DePalma, Pataki's Various Shades of Green, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/19/nyregion/19pataki.html?pagewanted=all.
308. Center for Health, Environment and Justice, Citizens' Environmental Coalition,
Healthy Building Network, New York Committee for Occupational Safety & Health, Uni-
formed Fire Officers Association, Governor Pataki Fails to Protect Health of Workers, Firefighters,
and Residents Across NY by Vetoing PVC Pipe Restriction Law, Press Release, December 16, 2004,
available at http://www.chej.org/ppc/docs/pvc-polyvinyl-chloride or vinyl/PVCNYPNR.pdf.
309. The Plastic Pipe Restriction Law, A 11660/7577, would have restricted the use of a
number of plastics.
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closing a facility in a non-residential Hudson area.3"' Pataki's record
of fulfilling his environmental promises is also lackluster. Pataki
vowed he would establish strict standards for mercury emissions from
power plants, enforce environmental regulations, and punish pollut-
ers; yet, Pataki failed to do so.31" '
In sum, public opinion on Pataki's environmental record is
mixed, making it difficult to weigh the legitimacy of his environmen-
tal commitment with the symbolic nature of the policies he supports.
Whether his environmental advocacy benefited his political career is
also unclear. Pataki publicly flirted with the idea of running for presi-
dent near the end of his gubernatorial term.3 12 Public support for
Pataki, however, dropped in 2005 to "its lowest level since his first
year as governor.. .. When offered the choice of Governor Pataki
or former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani as a presiden-
tial candidate, 55% of those polled chose Giuliani, whereas only 16%
chose Pataki.314 One cannot conclude one way or another whether
Pataki's promotion of his environmental justice policy, or its per-
ceived failure, played a role in either the advancement or demise of
his political career.
D. Policy 29: Symbolic or Not?
Applying Newig's analysis, we cannot conclude that Policy 29 is
merely symbolic politics because the policy directives are aligned
with and are capable of achieving the policy's stated goals. However,
Newig's analysis is in adequate for assessing symbolic politics because
310. Leon Tulton, Bus Depot Reopens, EAST HARLEM NEWS, September 25, 2003,
http://www.east-harlem.com/mt/archives/2003_09.html.
311. DePalma, supra note 307. Erin Crotty, former DEC Commissioner during Pataki's
administration is also criticized for failing to ward off interference from industry opposed to
tough environmental regulations and for "lacking sufficient independence from the governor's
office[.]"Anthony DePalma, Head of Environmental Agency Plans to Step Down, N.Y. TiMES, Jan-
uary 15, 2005.
312. Gershman, supra note 303.
313. A New York Times public poll found that the public was dissatisfied with Pataki for
a number of reasons, including his stance on the death penalty, late budgets, and the inability of
lawmakers to agree on major issues such as school financing. Michael Slackman & Marjorie
Connelly, Pataki's Rating Declines Sbarply in Poll of State, N.Y. TIMES, February 15, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/15/nyregion/15york.html.
314. Id. Twenty-three percent of those polled said they would not want either to run for
president.
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it does not consider the whole picture of the legislation or policy at
issue. His typology fails to ask the fundamental question of whether
the policy does what it publicly purports to do. That is, he misses a
large category of symbolic politics where the legislators represent a
law as being more substantive than it actually is. Policy 29 does in fact
correspond to the more general definition of symbolic politics of-
fered initially by Edelman,3"' and later by Bliihdorn316 where the gen-
eral public is deceived by the politico, either deliberately as a matter
of strategic choice or due to inescapable pressures.
It is admittedly difficult to assess whether political actors are be-
ing strategic in pursuance of grander career goals, taking a political
stance on the issue of protecting minority and low-income communi-
ties from adverse environmental conditions, or attempting to take the
issue off the table until a better solution could be found (or some
combination thereof). What is clear with Polity 29, however, is that
the executive branch held it up as something that it was not while
simultaneously building a reputation as being environmentally pro-
tective. The general public could not have grasped the meaningless
nature of the policy's inconspicuous and vaguely phrased goals (to
"promote the concept of environmental justice"), especially consider-
ing how the governor and DEC Commissioner had touted the policy
as "the most effective strategy for preventing or reducing dispropor-
tionately adverse environmental effects on low-income and minority
communities."" 7 Such a scenario, where the politico touts a specific
objective to be achieved through a policy, only to release a much dif-
ferent and watered down policy with goals so vaguely stated that the
public could not possibly grasp their meaningless character, serves as
a useful future prong for analyzing the symbolic nature of a policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The DEC's policy may package what appears to be a number of
suitable means appropriate for addressing environmental justice.
These include measures to enhance public participation as well as
315. See supra note 23.
316. See supra note 18.
317. DEC Press Release, supra note 25.
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methods to enhance the permitting requirements in these communi-
ties. In a perfect world, increasing the residents' knowledge of envi-
ronmental toxins in their communities would arm them with the
proper weapons and ammunition to defend themselves against an im-
pending attack. In the case of Policy 29, however, these residents are
given little more than access to a hotline to call between nine and five
and to have a few administrative documents translated for them. The
primary source of information regarding potentially toxic projects in
their community will come from the permit applicant proposing the
project. The heightened permit requirements, arguably the most sub-
stantive means for addressing environmental justice, in effect do lit-
tle, if anything, to address issues of environmental injustice. But, does
the state's policy do anything positive in terms of addressing envi-
ronmental justice? The answer must be "yes." By creating the policy,
the state is acknowledging that minority and low-income communi-
ties are exposed to a disparate amount of adverse environmental ef-
fects. The state is now offering grants to these communities to im-
prove their environment. A dialogue is occurring around the plight of
these communities. And there is an Office of Environmental Justice,
even if it does little more than translate documents and answer phone
calls from residents.
Despite the potential benefits arising from the policy, the decep-
tive and symbolic nature of Policy 29 should not be overlooked. First
and foremost, the general public may (at least for a period of time)
believe that the state is actually going to address the disproportionate
exposure to environmental hazards. Little do voters know, the state is
not even assessing where these disproportionate exposures are occur-
ring under the policy.31 The real danger of the symbolic nature of
318. At some point, states should revisit the very definition of environmental justice. It is
conceivably too narrow to define an environmental justice community demographically, with-
out regard for the distribution of hazardous pollutants and associated health risks within these
communities. It is at the same time perhaps too restrictive to define an environmental justice on
the percentage of minority or low-income residents, excluding neighborhoods and communities
outside of these parameters. It is also perhaps too narrow to discuss only environmental justice
in terms of the distribution of environmental hazards or pollutants as Policy 29 does, without
regard for other issues often faced by low-income and minority environmental justice commu-
nities, such as lack of green spaces, parks, access to health care, and even a scarcity of trees in
many inner-city urban environments. Honing in on what environmental justice actually means,
in the literature and in state policies, could help guide the way to more authentic policies capa-
ble of identifying problems and the solutions that would address them.
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the policy is that it has the potential to thwart development of au-
thentic policies related to environmental justice and deter continued
action of investment on behalf of state representatives and communi-
ty groups. This can occur out of the public's disillusionment with the
state and its current lackluster performance on addressing environ-
mental justice, or out of a misconception that the state is already
handling the issue with its current policy-if the state already has an
environmental justice policy, then the general public may be less apt
to push for legislation or a new policy. Further, the resources being
used to administer the current policy (office staff, translating permit
application process documents, etc.) are currently unavailable to im-
plement environmental justice programs that may have more of a di-
rect impact on community enhancement (e.g., pollution monitoring,
planting trees to absorb pollution, health care related to effects of air
pollution-i.e., respiratory illness).
Other implications of the current symbolic policy include the
souring public perceptions of the agency's ability to carry out the
task, resulting in potential long-term negative effects on the engaged
involvement of the electorate. This can be politically damaging be-
cause it undermines public trust in political institutions and impairs
the ability of citizens to make effective use of their democratic rights.
Lastly, the practice is simply morally rotten because it aims to distort
political realities, deceive righteous citizens and conceal hidden agen-
das. Whether the symbolic nature of New York's environmental jus-
tice policy was intentional or not, its structure allowed for politicians
to vote for civil rights and environmental protection without substan-
tively addressing either.
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